Security and Strategic Studies

	Module Descriptor: Security Studies
Title:	**Security Studies**
Description:	This course will examine contemporary and conceptual issues in conflict and security studies.
Teaching Hours:	50 hours directed study. 100 hours independent study. 150 hours in total
Module aims:	It will provide the opportunity to address key areas of contemporary concern within security studies through a range of theories and practical suggestions.
Rationale:	Knowledge generation that will be useful in security, and public organs in the contemporary world.
Learning Outcomes:	Since security studies cannot claim theoretical coherence or a governing orthodoxy, students will be expected to demonstrate familiarity with a wide range of approaches and concepts.

Introduction: From Strategic, to Conflict, to Security Studies

This text provides an introduction to Security Studies, the sub-discipline of International Relations that deals with the study of security. War and the threat to use force are part of the security equation, but the prevalence of threats is far-reaching for Security Studies. They encompass dangers ranging from pandemic and environmental degradation to terrorism and inter-state armed conflict. The latter is actually a sub-field of Security Studies and is known as Strategic Studies. This edition examines differing approaches to the study of security such as realism, liberalism, social constructivism, and postcolonialism. It also investigates the deepening and broadening of security to include military security, regime security, societal security, environmental security, and economic security. Finally, it discusses a range of traditional and non-traditional issues that have emerged on the security agenda, including weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, energy security, and health.

(Re)Thinking Security

Security's Progress 1. There is good research on a new defense 2. Using this defense becomes a recognized "best practice" 3. It is inscribed on assorted auditors' checklists 4. A change in technology or the threat model renders it all but useless 5. It stays on the checklists… (Do you still shred your old punch cards and paper tapes?)

Technology Changes ☐ Single-job batch systems ☐ Multi-user timesharing systems ☐ Mainframes; Unix; "superminis" ☐ Stand-alone microcomputers ☐ DOS (no OS protection) ☐ Dial-up PCs ☐ Networked PCs running full-blown OSes ☐ Smartphones, tablets, etc ☐ The "Internet of things"? I've used all except, perhaps, the last…

Threat Model Changes ☐ Joy hackers ☐ "Pursuit of knowledge" ☐ Manual hacking, often via stepping stones ☐ Annoying viruses and worms ☐ Random spread; most did little damage ☐ The spammer/hacker alliance ☐ Worms that don't shut down the Internet; bots as payloads ☐ Cyberespionage ☐ Cyberattacks (Stuxnet, Flame, Shamoon) ☐ "Preparing the battlefield"?

Security Advice ☐ Pick strong passwords ☐ Use a firewall ☐ Run current antivirus software ☐ Stay up to date on patches

Security Advice ☐ Pick strong passwords ☐ The Morris-Thompson paper is from 1979, an

era of electromechanical terminals and few logins   ☐ Use a firewall   ☐ Smartphones, tablets, and laptops move around   ☐ Run current antivirus software   ☐ It's increasingly ineffective   ☐ Stay up to date on patches   ☐ What about 0-day attacks?

Passwords (1979)   ☐ Password strength rationale is from the days of electromechanical terminals   ☐ No local computational capability   ☐ No keystroke loggers or user malware   ☐ Moore's Law change since 1978: about 4,000,000× improvement

(Picture courtesy Perry Metzger)

Passwords   ☐ Old scenario: hacker steals hashed system password file from timesharing machine   ☐ New scenarios: ☐ Hacker steals application—not system—password file from web server   ☐ May be plaintext, for password recovery   ☐ Secondary authentication questions are jokes   ☐ Malware plants keystroke loggers   ☐ Users are lured to phishing websites

Firewalls   ☐ Firewalls are topological barriers   ☐ They work best if they themselves are small and simple, and enforce a limited security policy —☐ A large company will have hundreds of authorized links that go through or around the firewall

Foresight? "The advent of mobile computing will also stress traditional security architectures… It will be more important in the future. How does one create a firewall that can protect a portable computer, one that talks to its home network via a public IP network? Certainly, all communication can be encrypted, but how is the portable machine itself to be protected from network-based attacks? What services must it offer, in order to function as a mobile host? What about interactions with local facilities, such as printers or disk space?"

Firewalls and Internet Security, Cheswick and Bellovin (1994)

Antivirus   ☐ "The antivirus industry has a dirty little secret: its products are often not very good at stopping viruses."(NY Times, 1/1/2013)   ☐ Most A/V programs are reactive; they work by looking for signatures of known malware   ☐ The new stuff can spread quite widely before the vendors update their signature databases   ☐ Tailored viruses may not be widespread

enough to make it into some A/V programs

Patches ☐ Patches are necessary, to fix known vulnerabilities ☐ It can take a long time produce a high-quality patch ☐ Despite that, production software is incompatible with new patches; testing is needed ☐ But—"Patch Tuesday" is followed by "Exploit Wednesday"; the bad guys reverse-engineer the patches

Where Did We Go Wrong? ☐ Static advice ☐ Static advice to use static defenses ☐ Dynamic, adaptive adversaries in a world of rapidly changing technology "Life is a dynamic process and can't be made static. '—and they all lived happily ever after' is fairy-tale stu—" (Robert Heinlein, Sixth Column (1941))

How Do We Improve? ☐ We cannot predict important new applications ☐ We cannot predict radically new devices, e.g., smartphones ☐ We cannot predict new classes of attacks ☐ We can make decent projections of improvements in CPU power, storage capacity, and price ☐ Is that enough?

Sometimes, Raw Power is the Threat ☐ One major threat to DES was brute force; this has been known since 1979 ☐ It happened, though later than forecast by Diffie and Hellman ☐ Their analysis said $20,000,000; straight-line Moore's Law would make that about $5K in 1997 ☐ The actual cost was about $250K ☐ But—we cannot predict cryptanalytic (or any other) breakthroughs

What Are Our Assumptions? ☐ Most security mechanisms rest on assumptions ☐ Often, these are implicit, and are not recognized even by the architects ☐ When our hardware, software, or usage patterns change, our assumptions can be invalidated ☐ But—since we never wrote them down, we don't know to look out for danger

Password Assumptions ☐ Attacker computing power ☐ PDP 11/70? ☐ Ratio of attacker/defender CPU power? ☐ Threat model ☐ Theft of hashed password file ☐ Serious limits to online guessing rate ☐ Limited number of passwords to be remembered ☐ Iterated cryptographic function can't be inverted Only the last has held up!

When Did These Fail?   □ Attacker computing power has been increasing gradually   □ Sharp increase after 2000, with the rise of botnets   □ More recent jump with the use of GPUs   □ Threat model changed around 2003, with the rise of for-profit hacking   □ Number of logins has been going up since the rise of the web—hard to pinpoint a number, but it was obviously an issue 10 years ago   □ But—our password policies remain about the same 18

Why is Threat Model Important?   □ More precisely, why is it an assumption?   □ We implicitly assume certain limits to the behavior of our enemies   □ Is someone going to break into your house to bug your keyboard?   □ "Amateurs worry about algorithms; pros worry about economics" (Allan Schiffman, 2004)   □ A stronger threat means the attacker has more resources

The Threat Matrix

Attacker Resources   □ Joy hackers: few; primarily downloaded scripts and exploits   □ The 1990s threat model   □ Targetiers: considerable knowledge about your systems and procedures; possibly inside access   □ Opportunistic attackers: sophisticated tools; often, plenty of money   □ APTs: everything, up to and including "the 3 Bs" (burglary, bribery, and blackmail)   □ We see this—to some extent—today

Assumptions Behind Firewalls   □ Obvious: topological nature   □ Less obvious: simple—i.e., comprehensible and correct—security policy   □ Less obvious: all interesting protocols are efficiently protectable by a firewall   □ Crucial but often ignored today: assumption that the firewall's implementation of a protocol is itself correct and secure To some extent, all of these are now false

Are Firewalls Themselves Secure?   □ There are far more protocols in use today   □ To function, the firewall must understand all of these   □ This implies a lot of code; often, a lot of very complex code   □ Why should we think this code is correct?

Firewalls and Threat Models   □ Joy hackers are probably stopped   □ Opportunistic hackers can get through, especially with worms, phishing, and drive-by downloads   □ Targetiers have detailed knowledge of topology and behavior; they may or may not be blocked

☐ To APTs, firewalls are just a speed-bump

Flow Monitoring Assumptions ☐ What are the assumptions? ☐ Why should it work? ☐ We assume: ☐ We can capture "enough" flows ☐ We will capture the evil ones ☐ We will be able to spot the flows of interest

Flow Rate ☐ Assume actual traffic of P packets per second and F flows/ second ☐ Implies P/F packets per flow ☐ Assume maximum capture rate of C flows/sec ☐ What is the relationship of F and C? ☐ If F>>C, we must down-sample and will miss important flows. Ultimate success may depend on technology changes: relative growth of F and C ☐ Statistical sampling may mean we'll something—and with an intelligent adversary, we may miss what the attackers want us to miss ☐ Assumption: the attacker can't manage that. True?

Limits to Flow Monitoring ☐ Size of the traffic matrix—it goes up as the square of the number of endpoints ☐ Memory bandwidth has only been increasing slowly ☐ Number of endpoints and bandwidth have both increased far more quickly ☐ Memory speeds haven't kept up ☐ Conclusion: sampling is necessary—but does it hurt us? ☐ That it doesn't is another assumption

Packets per Flow ☐ What is the behavior of the monitoring system for low P/F? ☐ Is there considerable overhead for creating state for a flow? ☐ Can the attacker use that to evade detection? ☐ Underlying assumption: behavior at low P/F just affects the random percentage picked up. Is this a way to hide?

Spotting Evil Flows ☐ Suppose the percentage of evil flows is very low—can we spot them? ☐ Can the attacker create enough benign-looking flows to hide amongst? ☐ Another assumption: evil flows have certain characteristics—size, destination, etc.—that we can spot. Can the attacker hide, via proxies and the like? ☐ Attack: compromise legitimate web site your users visit; serve malware from there ☐ "Low and slow" attacks? 29

Spotting Exfiltration ☐ Underlying assumption: all traffic to a given destination is equivalent ☐ But—sites like gmail, Facebook, etc., are multipurpose ☐ Second assumption: looking more deeply at flows can show anomalies ☐ Can the attacker mimic them?

"And by the way, we are belittling our opponents and building up a disastrous overconfidence in ourselves by calling them pirates. They are not— they can't be. Boskonia must be more than a race or a system—it is very probably a galaxywide culture. It is an absolute despotism, holding its authority by means of a rigid system of rewards and punishments. In our eyes it is fundamentally wrong, but it works—how it works! It is organized just as we are, and is apparently as strong in bases, vessels, and personnel." E.E. "Doc" Smith, Galactic Patrol (1950)

Final Thoughts ☐ Our defenses are built for a given threat and a given set of technologies
☐ Neither of these are static—and we can't be, either

Socialization, Community, and Western Security Practices

This article examines the dynamics and implications of practices of socialization enacted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in post-Cold War Central and Eastern Europe. With particular emphasis on the Czech Republic and Romania, I argue that NATO relied extensively on mechanisms of teaching and persuasion to project a particular set of liberal-democratic norms of security into the former Eastern bloc. Several interrelated conditions affected NATO's ability to teach new norms to Central and East European actors: the parties' mutual recognition of their respective roles as "teachers" and "students"; the socializees' identification with the Western security community that NATO claimed to embody; and systematic interactions between teachers and students. In teaching new liberal-democratic norms, NATO exercised significant power: the power to shape its socializees' interpretations of the world and ideas about proper ways of acting in that world. The shared ideational framework established via teaching also empowered subsequent persuasive appeals launched in the name of liberal-democratic norms. NATO conducted a socialization process that targeted-and often affected-not simply the behavior of Central and East European socializees, but also their definitions of national identity and interests.

Journal Information

International Organization is a leading peer-reviewed journal that covers the entire field of international affairs. Subject areas include: foreign policies, international relations, international and comparative political economy, security policies, environmental disputes and resolutions, European integration, alliance patterns and war, bargaining and conflict resolution, economic development and adjustment, and international capital movements. Guidelines for Contributors at Cambridge Journals Online

Security and "Securitization" Theory

Securitisation theory shows us that national security policy is not a natural given, but carefully designated by politicians and decision-makers. According to securitisation theory, political issues

are constituted as extreme security issues to be dealt with urgently when they have been labelled as 'dangerous', 'menacing', 'threatening', 'alarming' and so on by a 'securitising actor' who has the social and institutional power to move the issue 'beyond politics'. So, security issues are not simply 'out there' but rather must be articulated as problems by securitising actors. Calling immigration a 'threat to national security', for instance, shifts immigration from a low priority political concern to a high priority issue that requires action, such as securing borders. Securitisation theory challenges traditional approaches to security in IR and asserts that issues are not essentially threatening in themselves; rather, it is by referring to them as 'security' issues that they become security problems.

The basics of securitisation theory

The end of the Cold War sparked a debate over ideas of security in IR between 'narrowers' and 'wideners'. The narrowers were concerned with the security of the state and often focused on analysing the military and political stability between the United States and the Soviet Union. Dissatisfied with this, wideners sought to include other types of threat that were not military in nature and that affected people rather than states. This expanded the security agenda by including concepts such as human security and regional security – together with ideas of culture and identity. Feminism had an important role in widening the agenda by challenging the idea that the sole provider of security was the state and that gender was irrelevant in the production of security. On the contrary, the state was often the cause of insecurities for women. Widening the agenda from a feminist perspective brought gender into focus by placing gender and women as the focus of security calculations and by demonstrating that gender, war and security were intertwined. It was an important development in the rise of a wider perspective on security. Whether one agrees with the wideners or the narrowers, the end of the Cold War indicated that security was an essentially contested concept – 'a concept that generates debates that cannot be resolved by reference to empirical evidence because the concept contains a clear ideological or moral element and defies precise, generally accepted definition' (Fierke 2015, 35). By pointing at the essentially contested nature of security, critical approaches to security argue that 'security' is not necessarily positive or universal, but context and subject dependent and even negative at times.

Because some administer security while others receive security, security produces uneven power relations between people. For example, in the context of the Global War on Terror, a person who looks Arab has been regarded with suspicion as a dangerous 'other' and there has been an increase in surveillance operations in Muslim communities on the presumption that because they fit a certain profile, they may be connected to terrorism. Viewed in this light, surveillance becomes a security apparatus of control and a source of insecurity. It is by questioning the essence of security in cases such as this that securitisation theory developed and widened the scope of security to include other referent objects beyond the state. A referent object, a central idea in securitisation, is the thing that is threatened and needs to be protected.

Securitisation theorists determined five sectors: the economic, the societal, the military, the political and the environmental sector. In each sector, a specific threat is articulated as threatening a referent object. For example, in the societal sector, the referent object is identity, while the referent objects in the environmental sector are the ecosystem and endangered species. It is only in the military sector that the referent object remains the state. By 'sectorialising' security, we understand that existential threats are not objective but instead relate to the different characteristics of each referent object. This technique also highlights the contextual nature of

security and threats. Suicide bomb attacks, for example, are a greater source of anxiety for some people today than they are for others. Yet we often hear suicide terrorism framed as a 'global' threat. Securitisation shows that it is incorrect to talk about issues such as terrorism as if they concern everyone around the world equally. By talking about referent objects we can ask: Security for whom? Security from what? And security by whom?

Central to securitisation theory is showing the rhetorical structure of decision- makers when framing an issue and attempting to convince an audience to lift the issue above politics. This is what we call a speech act – 'by saying the words, something is done, like betting, giving a promise, naming a ship' (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998, 26). Conceptualising securitisation as a speech act is important as it shows that words do not merely describe reality, but constitute reality, which in turn triggers certain responses. In the process   of describing

the reality we see, we also interact with that world and perform an action that will greatly contribute to seeing that reality in a different way.   For example, referring to an immigration camp in Calais as 'the Jungle' is not simply describing what the camp really is, but portraying it as a lawless and dangerous place. Hence, threats are not just threats by nature, but are constructed as threats through language. In order to convince an audience to take extraordinary measures, the securitising actor must draw attention and often exaggerate the urgency and level of the threat, communicate a point of no return, i.e. 'if we do not tackle this problem, everything else will be irrelevant', and offer a possible way out (lifting the issue above politics) – which is often framed in military terms. In so doing, the securitising actor makes some actions more intelligible than others and enables a regime of truth about the nature of the threat and about the referent object's nature.

An issue becomes securitised when an audience collectively agrees on the nature of the threat and supports taking extraordinary measures. If the audience rejects the securitising actor's speech act, it only represents a securitising move and the securitisation has failed. In this respect, the focus on the audience and on process requires considerably more than simply 'saying security'. This has generated criticism from some scholars, who recommend understanding securitisation as a long process of ongoing social constructions and negotiation between various audiences and speakers. Any security issue can be presented on a spectrum ranging from non-politicised (the issue has not reached public debate) to politicised (the issue has raised public concerns and is on the agenda) to securitised (the issue has been framed as an existential threat). When an issue is securitised, actions are often legitimised under the language of 'urgency' and 'existential threats' and are measures that may be deemed undemocratic in normal situations. Security measures in the War on Terror, such as the Guantanamo Bay detention camp, the use of torture, the increased surveillance of citizens, extraordinary renditions and secretive drone strikes, illustrate the logic of exceptionality. Had the War on Terror not been framed in a context in which a suspension of normal politics was permissible and necessary, these security measures would probably not have existed – nor would they have endured to the present day.

A successful securitisation places 'security' as an exceptional realm, investing securitising actors (nominally states) with the power to decide when the democratic framework should be suspended and with the power to manipulate populations. For Wæver (2015 and 2000), securitisation theory was built to protect politics against the disproportionate power of the state by placing the success and failure of securitisation in the hands of the audience, rather than in the securitising actor. Wæver also voiced his preference for 'desecuritisation' – a return to normal politics. After all, audiences are not complete dupes at the mercy of the securitising actor, and by

making the process more transparent, securitisation theory endows the audience with agency and responsibility. In this context, the role of the security analyst moves from objectively analysing the threat to studying the processes by which securitising actors construct a shared understanding of what is collectively recognised as a threat. Securitisation theory is thus not so much involved with answering 'why' an issue has been securitised. It is more important that we be concerned with the conditions that have made the securitisation possible by asking 'how' questions: how has a specific language enabled the actor to convince the audience of the threat?

Securitisation theory and the Islamic State group in Europe

Following attacks in a range of European cities, the Islamic State group (also known as Daesh, ISIS or ISIL) became a high priority on security agendas from 2015 onwards. The group has been presented as a threat to the security of the state, to the security of individuals in Western Europe and more broadly as a threat to the Western way of life. This means that the securitisation of the Islamic State group affects at least three sectors: the societal, the military and the political. Securitisation theory observes that sometimes in a democracy the government must justify the suspension of normal politics to the public. Hence, if the Islamic State group is securitised in European states, which are regarded as democratic, we should be seeing securitising moves from government officials – a rhetorical justification of why intervention, for instance, is the only way to remove the threat of the Islamic State.

It is important to note that securitising actors are not limited to politicians. Security professionals like the police, intelligence services, customs, immigration services, border guards and the military all play an important role in defining the security landscape. They operate within a field of security characterised by competition over the 'right' knowledge over the threat and other risks associated, as well as competition over the 'right' solution. Although disagreements and confrontation occur between security professionals, Bigo, Bonditti and Olsson (2010, 75–78) argue that they are still guided by a set of common beliefs and practices. Securitising actors take security threats objectively and seek to solve them by undertaking various missions. In addition, there are also functional actors who can influence the dynamic of the field of security but who do not have the power to move an issue above politics. Functional actors are paramount since they help frame storylines about the existentially threatening nature of the issue, often creating divides between 'us' and 'them' – and often implicated in 'othering' processes. Examples of functional actors can be the media, academia, non- governmental agencies and think tanks. It can also include individuals themselves, by telling and sharing stories between friends, families and colleagues. For example, extreme claims made in tabloid newspapers across Europe create a narrative in which the Islamic State group is infiltrating society and working to bring on the demise of the democratic state.

Noticeable examples of securitising moves in the United Kingdom can be found during the House of Commons debate on the motion for British military action in Syria on 2 December 2015. British Prime Minister David Cameron argued that 'we face a fundamental threat to our security' from the threat of the Islamic State group, who 'attack us because of who we are, and not because of what we do' (this was the presentation of the nature of the threat and establishment of a regime of truth). He then said that 'we should not wait any longer' to reduce the threat (this was the point of no return). Finally, he pointed out that it is 'not about whether we want to fight terrorism but about how best we do that' (this was the solution provided).

It is more evident in France, when, after the Paris attacks of 13 November 2015, President Francois Hollande declared that 'France is at war' against an army of jihadists that 'has attacked France because France is a country of liberty' (again, focus on 'what and who we are'). In this framing, the French people are 'a people that is fierce, valiant and courageous' and are victims of such attacks for simply 'being alive'. At the other end of the spectrum is 'them', 'an army of jihadists', of 'coward murderers' who constitute an 'abomination' and 'vile attack' that can only be characterised by 'horror'. A point of no return is invoked when Hollande claims that the Islamic State group is an organisation that 'threatens the whole world' and that this 'is the reason why the destruction of Daesh is a *necessity* for the international community'. Finally, the solution, lifting the issue 'above politics' is offered: 'immediate border controls and a state of emergency have been commanded' (Hollande 2015).

The grammar of the security speech act is discernible. The speech points to the existentially threatening nature of the Islamic State group, a point of no return and a solution which breaks free of the normal democratic processes. In the months after the Paris attacks, Hollande increased French military strikes in Syria and ordered a state of emergency that gave French security forces controversial domestic powers. Hence, we have a case of successful securitisation. It is important to note that when arguing that the Islamic State group is securitised, securitisation theorists do not challenge the existence of the group, or that the group has indeed coordinated attacks in Europe.

Instead, securitisation questions the processes by which this group has come to be viewed as a threat and argues that by naming the group a threat, leaders of European states such as France and the United Kingdom are also implicated in the making of war. In that sense, securitisation highlights how Hollande's securitising speech act does not merely describe a state of affairs 'out there', but constitutes the attacks as an act of war and by doing so, brings war into being. Describing the threat of the Islamic State group is thus not impartial or objective, rather it is in an action in and of itself, and one that should be viewed as a political act.

Using securitisation theory shows that the politics of terrorism and counterterrorism is about threat magnification and that the symbolic violence caused by attacks is out of proportion to the number of deaths it is responsible for. For example, the number of victims in Western Europe was higher in the 1970s and 1980s as a result of groups such as the IRA than the number that can be attributed to Islamic terrorists in recent times. Yet leaders of European countries claim that the world has never faced such 'barbarity', 'horror' and 'atrocity'. This threat magnification demonstrates the exceptionality of the threat, which, in turn, requires urgent and extraordinary responses. Thinking of terrorism in this way is not only detrimental to the deliberative process but also limits our understanding of terrorism more generally.

Conclusion

Securitisation is a useful tool for students in IR as it contests traditional approaches to security that are overly focused on the security of the state, rather than on other referent objects. Adopting a securitisation framework entails challenging hegemonic and taken-for-granted ideas about the universality and objectivity of security and emphasises the ways in which knowledge is not merely 'out there' but is driven by interests. Securitisation theory reminds us that securitisation is not a neutral act but a political one. From that starting point we are able to dig deeper and

investigate the various insecurities that are found in international relations.

Security Studies & Human Security

The Human and Critical Security Studies module examines the meanings, mechanisms and agents of security, acknowledging shifts from the traditional notion of national security to forms of Human Security and critiques of the state. The module investigates processes and phenomena that pose direct threats to groups of people and, in doing so, potentially destabilise or aggravate situations. Famine, the oil trade and AIDS undermine people physically, politically and psychologically, and on occasions result in further forms of insecurity as people resist, retaliate or take advantage of volatile situations. The course also incorporates analysis of contingent – and differentiating – social factors such as age, gender, class and identity and the way that these shape and are shaped by experiences of security. The course draws on literature from a range of sources. The academic literature derives predominantly from Development Studies, Political Science and International Relations. This provides varied analysis of the nature and function security policy, including policies relating to human security. In addition to this, there is a rapidly expanding academic literature linking specific threats to processes of vulnerability, insecurity, terror and globalisation. This is accompanied by literature by pressure groups working on the issues concerned: on AIDS, famine, corporate responsibility, the environment and human rights. The UN, itself heavily involved in forging the meanings of security, has produced documents relating to health, climate change and other elements covered in the course.

Human security suggests that security policy and security analysis, if they are to be effective and legitimate, must focus on the individual as the referent and primary beneficiary. In broad terms, human security is "freedom from want" and "freedom from fear:" positive and negative rights as they relate to threats to core individual needs. Human security is normative; it argues that there is an ethical responsibility to (re)orient security around the individual in line with internationally recognized standards of human rights and governance. Much human security scholarship is therefore explicitly or implicitly underpinned by a solidarist commitment to moral obligation, and some are cosmopolitan in ethical orientation. However, there is no uncontested definition of, or approach to, human security, though theorists generally start with human security challenges to orthodox neorealist conceptions of international security. Nontraditional and critical security studies (which are distinct from human security scholarship) also challenges the neorealist orthodoxy as a starting point, although generally from a more sophisticated theoretical standpoint than found in the human security literature. Critical security studies can be conceived broadly to embrace a number of different nontraditional approaches which challenge conventional (military, state-centric) approaches to security studies and security policy. Human security has generally not been treated seriously within these academic security studies debates, and it has not contributed much either.

Global Terrorism

Although the term is not subject to a universally agreed definition, terrorism can be broadly understood as a method of coercion that utilizes or threatens to utilize violence in order to spread fear and thereby attain political or ideological goals. Contemporary terrorist violence is thus distinguished in law from "ordinary" violence by the classic terrorist "triangle": A attacks B, to convince or coerce C to change its position regarding some action or policy desired by A. The attack spreads fear as the violence is directed, unexpectedly, against innocent victims, which in turn puts pressure on third parties such as governments to change their policy or position. Contemporary terrorists utilize many forms of violence, and indiscriminately target civilians, military facilities and State officials among others.

The challenges of countering terrorism are not new, and indeed have a long history. The term "terrorism" was initially coined to describe the Reign of Terror, the period of the French Revolution from 5 September 1793 to 27 July 1794, during which the Revolutionary Government directed violence and harsh measures against citizens suspected of being enemies of the Revolution. In turn, popular resistance to Napoleon's invasion of the Spanish Peninsula led to a new form of fighter—the "guerrilla", which derives from the Spanish word guerra, meaning "little war" (Friedlander, 1976, p. 52). As a weapon of politics and warfare, however, the use of terrorism by groups can be traced back to ancient times, and as noted by Falk, "in various forms, terrorism is as old as government and armed struggle, and as pervasive" (Falk, 1990, pp. 39, 41). The focus of this module, and of the University Module Series as a whole, is on terrorist violence and the threats carried out by non-State groups and the response of the international community, especially States, regional organizations and the United Nations system.

LEARNING OUTCOMES

• Understand the semantic and historical development of the word "terrorism". • Analyse the concept and underpinning legal principles of international crimes of terrorism, whether at the national or international level. • Explain treaty-based crimes relevant for prosecuting acts of terrorism, whether at the national or international level. • Identify and discuss some of the reasons for, and implications of, the absence of a universally accepted definition of terrorism at the global level. • Familiarize students with interdisciplinary perspectives (e.g., victimology).

The purpose of this Module is to introduce students to the key concepts and principles that underpin international instruments and institutions concerned with the complex topics of terrorism and how to counter terrorism, as well as any hard, security-based, responses adopted by States when confronted with acts of terrorism. When considering the concept of terrorism, it is important to note that as yet, there is no global consensus regarding an agreed definition of the term "terrorism" for legal purposes (see further Module 4). This Module will also provide a brief overview of modern terrorism and its implications for the international community. Regarding the prosecution of the perpetrators of acts of terrorism, it is vital to understand how, why and to what extent, the impact of a lack of a universally agreed global legal definition of the term may have had on the effective investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences. Principally, prosecuting chargeable crimes must rely on the judicial forums available. A decision to prosecute a "terrorist" offence will depend, among other factors, on legal and non-legal considerations.

Furthermore, the State of custody must decide either to prosecute (as a "terrorist" or an ordinary crime) or to extradite elsewhere for prosecution persons accused of serious, transboundary terrorist crimes. Choosing between prosecuting on the grounds of "terrorist" or of ordinary crimes also involves wider issues such as the distinction between armed and non-armed conflict, the State use of counter-terrorist force and the return of "terrorists" who have been fighting abroad.

Notwithstanding the absence of a globally agreed, legal definition of terrorism, an effective and prevention-focused international response to terrorism is highly desirable, particularly one guided by a normative legal framework and embedded in the core principles of the rule of law, due process and respect for human rights. Many international and regional legal instruments already exist which are dedicated to countering and deterring terrorism (see further Modules 4 and 5), primarily through the investigation and prosecution of those suspected of committing related crimes by means of State criminal justice processes. While such international and regional instruments provide for effective prevention mechanisms, including interventions targeting specific types of criminal acts (e.g., hostage-taking, the hijacking of planes or ships, terrorist bombings and the funding of terrorism), States implement their treaty obligations differently. As a result, criminal justice responses and outcomes in investigating and prosecuting terrorism-related crimes may vary between States.

Since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, international support for more effective counter-terrorism measures and responses has led to greater international cooperation in counter-terrorist matters, and there is certainly evidence of a widespread hardening of approaches to the prosecution of "terrorists". This is important in a context that is witnessing the increased export and globalization of terrorism by groups such as Al-Qaida and the Islamic State in Syria and the Levant (ISIL, or Da'esh), a trend that shows no sign of abating. In response, States are utilizing a range of counter-terrorism measures, from criminal justice

mechanisms—which should represent the usual response, including as a means of terrorism prevention—to "harder" security-based measures accompanied by increased military spending. Although, as discussed in Module 6, military responses may be entirely appropriate where the requisite legal criteria are met, such as the threshold of violence necessary to constitute an armed conflict, these are also accompanied by increased complexities. For example, in most situations "terrorist" groups do not cross the requisite threshold for the application of international humanitarian law (International Law Association, 2010). Yet when States utilize armed force, it can be argued that international humanitarian law should apply (an approach adopted as "policy" by a number of States) to the treatment and prosecution of captured non-State violent actors, not least because international humanitarian law mandates strong due process rights and humanitarian treatment of all those placed hors de combat (see further Module 6).

The landscape of terrorism and counter-terrorism is complex and sensitive due to these and other factors examined throughout the University Module Series. When considering the future of terrorism therefore, it can be helpful first to look backwards, albeit briefly, to the modern origins of the criminal phenomenon referred to today as international or transboundary terrorism.

Together with a brief overview of the history of terrorism, this Module will also consider the evolution of terrorism in the twentieth century. In doing so, where examples are informative, these are drawn from terrorist organizations which have been formally designated as such within the United Nations system, namely Al-Qaida and ISIL (Security Council resolution 1267 (1999) and subsequent resolutions). That is not to say that other "terrorist" groups are any less important

or that the impact of their criminal activities is any less significant in their areas of operation; rather it is reflective of some of the legal and political complexities underlying many of the issues examined in this University Module Series, a number of which circle back to the inability of the international community to agree on a universal definition of terrorism. Without this, it is often not possible to reach universal agreement, for instance, regarding the designation of "terrorist" groups. For similar reasons, since matters of "terrorist" motivations can be politically sensitive, the discussion of terrorism throughout the University Module Series is largely framed around related criminal acts and not any underlying ideologies or other motivating factors (e.g., self-determination), consistent with the approach of the international community, as reflected within the universal anti-terrorism conventions examined in Module 4.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF TERRORISM

In terms of targeting, many of the tactical means and methods of modern terrorism have, until relatively recently, followed those utilized between States in their armed conflicts inter se. It has been argued specifically that, a century ago, terrorist codes on targeting victims closely resembled professional military codes, in that they respected the distinction between soldiers and officials on the one hand, and innocent civilians on the other (e.g., the targeted

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assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria on 28 June 1914) (Walzer, 1977, pp. 197234). This was the case from approximately the mid-nineteenth century onwards, when increasingly industrialized weaponry facilitated a lack of targeting, in the sense that killing the enemy became more indiscriminate and deadly. The industrialized and indiscriminate means and methods of warfare utilized during the two "total wars" of the twentieth century (e.g., in widespread disregard of the principle of distinction) effectively taught those who would become post-war revolutionary terrorists, and who also would adopt more irregular weapons and forms of fighting, such as urban guerrilla warfare. In the contemporary world, indiscriminate weaponry (e.g., high-level bombing capacities, weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), and so on) is a recurring feature.

In terms of terrorist strategy, a useful way to conceptualize the evolution of modern terrorism as a resort to revolutionary violence is provided by David Rapoport's influential concept of the "waves" of terrorism (The Four Waves of Terrorism). For example, one wave is the late nineteenth century/early twentieth century "anarchist wave". Another is the "anti-colonial wave" (starting with the post-World War I political principle of self-determination, e.g., the Aaland Islands arbitration in 1921, and its violent evolution into a legal right after World War II, examples being the Algerian Civil War and the Vietnam War).

In turn, the tactics employed in each of these waves often mirrored those utilized between States during armed conflict, not least because demobilized soldiers throughout the ages have returned to their homes at the end of a war fully trained tactically to utilize force, while the name of each terrorist wave reflects its dominant strategic goals. The wave theory further reflects that terrorist groups rise and fall, that they can dissolve when no longer capable of inspiring others to continue with violent resistance to authority, to violently redress one or other grievance, or to protest violently against a lack of political concessions. This point also suggests that terrorism and its motivations are clearly impacted by the conditions of and changes in social and political cultures. In contrast, Parker and Sitter (2016) posit that violent terrorist situations occur around the world not so much in waves, but because terrorist actors are motivated differentially through four goal-oriented strains: socialism, nationalism, religious extremism or exclusionism. These underlying motivators are not chronologically sequential, i.e., one strain dies and a new one arises. Instead, they can work in parallel, and can occasionally overlap, to motivate different terrorist movements according to their needs.

Such academic discourse offers a flavour of some of the discussions and debates that occur when

seeking to better comprehend or categorize "terrorist" groups. This University Module Series, however, does not take a view regarding what the motivational factors of various nonState actors may or may not be. These are issues that those teaching this or any other parts of this University Module Series may wish to explore further within different contexts.

TERRORISM IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Modern terrorism can be traced back to nineteenth century revolutionary radicalism, and, in particular, the emergence of "anarchist", "collectivist anarchist" and "anarcho-communist"

MODULE 1 INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 5

groups. For example, from the mid-nineteenth century onwards, groups led or influenced by the Frenchman Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, author of What is Property? (1840), the German Karl Marx, and the Russian Mikhail Bakunin, were promoting one or another anti-establishment model. Within a decade, similar groups had appeared throughout Western Europe, the Balkans and Asia. The German revolutionary Karl Heinzen was the first to articulate the use of violence, even mass murder, by individuals to effect political change in his influential 1853 pamphlet, Mord und Freiheit, coining the term Freiheitskämpfer or "freedom fighter" in the process. However, as these early radicals became disillusioned by their failure to provoke widespread social revolution among the peasantry through traditional means such as distributing political pamphlets and leaflets urging uprisings and riots to put government under pressure, they turned instead to violence in the hope of forcing political reform and of undermining the State. In this way, "propaganda by the deed", as a strategy for political action, became central to the politics of European anarchism (see, for example, Fleming, 1980).

The principal violent method of spreading terror utilized by virtually all such groups at the time was targeted assassination, which not only carried with it serious personal risk but also the potential for political martyrdom. The assassination of Czar Alexander II in 1881 by the Russian revolutionary group Narodnaya Volya is emblematic of this period of terrorism. Targeted assassination could be differentiated from ordinary criminal acts, because targeting persons acting in an official State capacity signified a deep, personal commitment to a "cause that could inspire others, and epitomised the revolutionary 'code of honour' by sparing innocent citizens". This arguably made terrorist assassination a more humane form of violence than civil war, since the terrorist's targeted attack would strike only against State "oppressors", and would help maintain the low casualty rate of terrorism that was also an advantage of the "propaganda by the deed" strategy (Morozov, 1880, p. 106).

Technological developments in the mid and late nineteenth century also played a pivotal role in the rise of terrorism. The ready availability of dynamite allowed terrorists to perpetrate and disseminate their deadly acts more widely as propaganda by the deed. The development of mass communication technologies allowed news, learning, ideas and events to be rapidly communicated across long distances, opening up an era of mass communication and of migration that was crucial to inspiring groups elsewhere. The invention of the telegraph and the steam-powered rotary press meant that newspapers could receive messages almost instantly after transmission from around the world and gave millions of people access to information about events virtually as soon as they occurred. New technologies, together with greater access to educational opportunities, facilitated the migration of agricultural labourers and artisans to urban centres. The development of commercial railways and trans-Atlantic passage steamers aided groups to travel long distances, and to carry their political sympathies further afield.

Although the successful assassination of Czar Alexander II would initially inspire a wave of anarchist violence that shook Europe and the Americas over the following decades (Zimmer, 2009), Russian rebels encouraged and trained a variety of rebel groups who were emerging elsewhere, even when their political aims were vastly different. While anarchists carried out bombings in France, Germany, Italy, Spain and elsewhere, which at times turned into cycles of

retribution between anarchists and the authorities (Zimmer, 2009), Western States

attempted to stem the tide through such legal mechanisms as immigration controls and extradition treaties targeted against "undesirable aliens". These included a protocol concerning measures to be taken against the anarchist movement, signed on behalf of nine States in March 1904, and an administrative convention for the exchange of information concerning individuals considered dangerous to society, signed in October 1905 (Hudson, 1941, p. 862). By the mid-nineteenth century, many extradition treaties exempted fugitives accused of "political offences" or "crimes of a political character" from extradition (Hannay, 1988, p. 116). Only the conservative regimes of Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Naples persisted in advocating that ideologically similar nations should use their extradition laws to help suppress each other's revolutionaries (Pyle, 1988, pp. 181-182).

On 28 June 1914, Gavrilo Princip, a young Serbian nationalist and supporter of the clandestine Black Hand group, which wished to bring about a Greater Serbia, assassinated the Archduke of Austria and heir presumptive, Franz Ferdinand, and his wife, in Sarajevo. This event unleashed a "domino effect" of defensive alliances developed in the pre-war years, leading to the "total war" of World War I, which irrevocably changed the face of terrorism for the eras to come. By the end of the war, with the return of fully-trained soldiers to their homes and families, the tactics and methods learned in "total war" between 1914 and 1918 would continue to haunt States. As revolutionary politics at the local level continued to simmer throughout the nineteenth century, the continued availability and use of "political offence" exceptions as grounds upon which States might refuse requests by other States for the extradition of persons suspected of having perpetrated violent offences for various ideological, religious or political motives highlighted the difficulties associated with distinguishing criminal acts of terrorism from criminal acts generally. These definitional issues have continued to the present day.

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND TERRORISM

The 1919 Versailles Peace Treaty between Germany and the Allied Powers that concluded World War I precipitated the next phase in the development of modern terrorism. The Covenant of the League of Nations (the League Covenant) redistributed former German and Turkish colonies and other dependencies through the League mandate system, which was designed to ensure a "mild form of international accountability for [their] administration" (Thullen, 1964, p. 9). Otherwise, standards to help integrate minority peoples in the new States created after 1919, such as Yugoslavia, were also provided for, and were intended to serve a peace-making function, while deterring transboundary alliances (Veatch, 1983/2010, p. 369). Nonetheless, protected common rights, such as the right to a nationality, the free exercise of belief, employment and identity, and rights enshrined in the ideals of the mandate system and policies on minorities did not apply to the peoples and minorities in the victorious States, which later were instead the guarantors of peace and security as a whole, while the victors also presumably rejected the notion of new colonial acquisitions when declining to annex former colonies and non-governing territories. Overall, the Covenant system of mutual defence appeared to be designed to favour international security concerns rather than those of the rule of law and international law, in the event of a conflict.

The twentieth century link between modern terrorism and the ideal of self-determination arose within the competing ideologies of communist/socialist theory (Lenin, 1914/1972), and those reflected in a League of Nations Covenant in which there is no express reference to the principle of self-determination. In contrast to the rejection of all prior Czarist debts and obligations by the post-war revolutionary Government of the Soviet Union, the United States, under the presidency of Woodrow Wilson, was a strong proponent of the "peoplehood" principle of self-determination

(Morgan, 1980, pp. 355-359). However, Wilson did not hold sway on this concept of self-determination at the Versailles conference at which the final version of the Covenant was agreed. In addressing the issue of self-determination, article VI of the Wilson-Miller draft of the proposed League Covenant provided that:

The League of Nations shall require all new states to bind themselves, as a condition precedent to their recognition as independent or autonomous states, to accord to all racial or national minorities within their jurisdiction exactly the same treatment and security, both in law and in fact, that is accorded to the racial or national majority of their people (Fawcett, 1979, p. 7).

Even so, such issues in the era of the League of Nations represented only a number of the factors to be considered during the formation of new States, whether within the operational context of mechanisms to attain statehood, or as a matter of self-help. When issues relating to self-determination arose early on in the League's existence during the Aaland Islands dispute in 1920 between Sweden and Finland, the League Council appointed the International Commission of Jurists to determine the matter. The Commission concluded that the mere recognition of the principle of self-determination, as made out in a number of treaties, did not create a positive rule of the law of nations (Wilson, 1988, p. 57). In part, this was due to the Committee's apprehension about creating a precedent for secession, thereby encouraging anarchy. However, a subsequent Committee of Inquiry refined this result by concluding that if Finland failed to provide the islanders with certain specified guarantees, they would indeed have a right under international law to a plebiscite, which could have resulted in separation from Finland. Nowadays, the Aaland Islands solution is regarded as a precedent for successful international dispute settlement (O'Brien, 2012).

In the meantime, the spate of terrorist assassinations continued. By the 1930s, several bilateral agreements referred to the suppression of terrorism, and many extradition treaties contained clauses excluding assassination attempts against Heads of State from the exempted list of political offences (e.g., Convention on Extradition 1933, article 3(e)). The assassinations of King Alexander I of Yugoslavia and the French Minister for Foreign Affairs together in Marseilles on 9 October 1934 brought matters to a head, when the requested extradition of the persons accused was refused by Italy on the grounds that the offences were political (Chadwick, 1996). In response, a Committee of Experts was established by the League Council to draft a Convention on Terrorism for the establishment of an International Criminal Court, which would have jurisdiction over certain acts specified as acts of terrorism in the Convention, and which States Parties were obliged to criminalize within their national laws. Article 1(2) of the Terrorism Convention defines "acts of terrorism" as "criminal acts directed against a state" (1937). Such acts must be "intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the

minds of particular persons, or a group of persons or the general public". The Convention is silent on the purpose of the fear generated (Chadwick, 1996).

Nonetheless, State and regional traditions of asylum, coupled with strong national sympathies, made any differentiation between "terrorist" and "political" offences problematic, and the granting of asylum remained possible then, as now. Moreover, the 1937 Terrorism Convention, as a creature of its time, had no "international" criminal law to be grounded in, as reflected in article 19, which provides that:

The present Convention does not affect the principle that, provided the offender is not allowed to escape punishment owing to an omission in the criminal law, the characterisation of the various offences dealt with in the present Convention, the imposition of sentences, the methods of prosecution and trial, and the rules as to mitigating circumstances, pardon and amnesty are determined in each country by the provisions of domestic law.

Therefore, the law applicable to any criminal prosecution for acts established as offences under

the Convention was to be that of the referring, and thus, prosecuting, State. Unfortunately, World War II erupted soon after, and neither convention entered into force.

THE UNITED NATIONS AND TERRORISM

A recurring feature of discussions, debates and political sensitivities regarding terrorism during the post-1945 United Nations era have related to issues of terror-violence by so-called "liberation fighters" claiming to be utilizing "direct action" to pursue their right to the selfdetermination of peoples, as they argued is provided for in the United Nations Charter (Treaty Series, vol. 1, no. XVI), articles 1(2) and 55 (see also 1941 Atlantic Charter). The Charter contextualizes the Organization's obligation to "develop friendly relations" among nations (not "States") based on the principles of equal rights and the self-determination of "peoples". Difficulties with and controversies regarding the practical operation of equal rights and selfdetermination soon arose, including where national liberation agendas stretched far beyond the narrow confines of the League of Nations mandate system and the protection of minorities. As a consequence, conflicting interpretations of relevant Charter principles and provisions surrounding self-determination quickly arose and have remained ever since.

This Module, as well as the University Module Series as a whole, does not attempt to comment on the accuracy or otherwise of particular legal or political positions. Rather it seeks to provide an impartial commentary on legal and interdisciplinary approaches to terrorism and counter-terrorism, by identifying the existence of ongoing debates, where appropriate, in order to assist students in better comprehending current approaches to the phenomenon of terrorism and current responses to it by States and intergovernmental organizations, including the United Nations system. On issues such as self-determination, including the ongoing "freedom fighter versus terrorist" conundrum, what is important to understand is that these issues have been, continue and are likely to remain contentious and have implications for issues such as the continuing inability of the international community to agree on a universal definition of terrorism with law-making consequences.

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In any event, many terrorist activities that have occurred during the post-1945 era have not been associated with self-determination debates at all. Identified causes of terrorism have instead ranged through the entire spectrum of human discontent, including the economic, political, social, psychological, ideological, etc., with short or long-term goals, both objective and subjective, becoming the object of violence (Whittaker, 2001, p. 33). In response, some in the international community, especially academics, have sought to label terrorist groups according to their motivational goals or ideologies rather than in terms of criminal acts, as is the approach within the United Nations system. Consequently, students may come across the categorization of such groups within scholarship as "revolutionary", "separatist", "ethnocentric", "nationalist" or "religious".

In terms of the use of violence and force by terrorists, this also ranges across a wide spectrum, from individuals with military training and experience, to what Whittaker has termed "throw away" operatives, who are effectively sent untrained on suicide missions. Their use of violence also illustrates the slow evolution of terrorist tactics and strategies, including traditional assassination, bombings, arson, hostage-taking, hijacking, kidnapping, sabotage, the perpetration of hoaxes and suicide bombings, to name but a few (see, for example, Global Terrorism Index 2017). More recent tactics can include unconventional forms of terrorism, including nuclear terrorism (for example, fabricating a dirty bomb, attacking a nuclear reactor, etc.), high-tech terrorism involving cyberattacks, ecological terrorism (for instance, the threat of destruction to the environment) and terrorist attacks aiming at destroying cultural heritage, as perpetrated by ISIL (see, for example, the Executive Committee of the Commonwealth of Independent States,

1999, article 1).

Of particular interest is the fact that such issues and debates have shaped the approach of the international community to its universal anti-terrorism conventions so that are framed around terrorist acts as serious international crimes regardless of any underlying motivation. Broadly speaking, anti-terrorism instruments were adopted roughly in three phases (see further Module 4). Beginning with legislation covering the safety of aviation and shipping, the early instruments were developed from the 1960s through to the early 1990s, and addressed specific types of terrorist offences. Notably, acts perpetrated during "liberation conflicts" were expressly made exceptions to terrorist crimes, for example, the 1979 Hostages Convention (Treaty Series, vol. 1316, p. 205, adopted 17 December 1979, entered into force 3 June 1983), as such acts were to be dealt with under other areas of international law, such as international humanitarian law. The most recent phase reflects the broadening, post-categorization of terrorist groups and "causes", to include groups such as the Taliban, Al-Qaida and ISIL, and thus reflect the contemporary terrorist threat to the international community. Within this latter phase, anti-terrorism instruments have been developed that deal with new crimes associated with terrorist bombings (1997, Treaty Series, vol. 2149, p. 256), the financing of terrorism (1999, Treaty Series, vol. 2178, p. 197) and nuclear terrorism (2005, Treaty Series, vol. 2445, p. 89).

In Modules 4 and 5, the evolution and substantive content of United Nations anti-terrorism instruments in the Charter era will be considered in more detail.

This section introduces students to the United Nations designation and targeted sanctions regimes against the Taliban, Al-Qaida, ISIL and affiliated individuals and groups under Security Council resolution 1267 (1999) and is aimed at promoting discussion on the strengths, weaknesses and challenges associated with the counter-terrorism approach of the United Nations under that resolution and its successive resolutions (see also Module 3).

There are two primary non-State groups, namely the Taliban and Al-Qaida, which have been designated "terrorist" organizations by the Security Council. In 1999, following the refusal of the Taliban to surrender Osama Bin Laden and his associates for their roles in the August 1988 attacks on United States Embassies in Kenya and the United Republic of Tanzania, under its resolution 1267 (1999) the Security Council designated as terrorist groups the Taliban and associated individuals and entities, through targeted travel and arms embargos, and financial/assets sanctions. In 2011, under Security Council resolution 1989 (2011), the Council divided the so-called "Consolidated List" of individuals and entities associated with the Taliban and Al-Qaida into two separate lists: the "Al-Qaida, or 1988 List", and the Taliban List, which contains those individuals and entities associated with the Taliban who are deemed to present an ongoing threat to the peace and security of Afghanistan. Finally, under Security Council resolution 2253 (2015), the Al-Qaida List was further extended to include ISIL and Al Nusrah Front (ANF).

See the reading list for further information on the groups and organizations designated by the Security Council, and their evolution, objectives, ideologies and tactical approaches. Moreover, in periodic reports to the Secretary-General, the Security Council has reported on the threat posed by ISIL, (Da'esh) to international peace and security. In its report to the Council on 29 January 2018 (S/2018/14), the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, which supports the Committee established under Security Council resolution 1267 (1999), states:

In Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic, Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) lost control over all remaining urban areas. The group continues to transform into a terror organization with a flat hierarchy, with cells and affiliates increasingly acting autonomously. The global fight against ISIL will have to focus on the threat posed by less visible international networks. The combination of "frustrated travellers", ISIL sympathizers, returnees and relocators poses an increased security risk for Member States. Attempts by ISIL to infuse money into the licit

economy in combination with a greater inflow of funds for reconstruction of recaptured areas will necessitate adjusted counter measures.

The global Al-Qaida network has remained resilient and in several regions poses a greater threat than ISIL. Despite being under military pressure, Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) increasingly serves as the communications hub for Al-Qaida as a whole. In North and West Africa, Al-Qaida affiliates and groups loyal to ISIL increased their activities; while in East Africa, Al-Shabaab has sustained its dominance over ISIL groups. In South Asia, Al-Qaida affiliates and ISIL are taking advantage of the volatile security situation in Afghanistan. Although the recapture of Marawi City by the Philippine authorities was a military success, the ability of ISIL affiliates to maintain a temporary stronghold within the city was a propaganda victory with potential long-term consequences for the region.

The global flow of foreign terrorist fighters has continued to slow, with only individual cases being reported. However, the marked reduction of territorial control by ISIL in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic will force many foreign terrorist fighters to make a choice between joining other groups or leaving the region. With the adoption of its resolution 2396 (2017), the Security Council has taken a significant step towards meeting the challenges posed by returnees and relocators.

In implementing their obligations under the sanctions regimes established against Al-Qaida, ISIL and other affiliated groups designated by the Security Council under resolution 1267 (1999), many States have established a range of domestic mechanisms for giving effect to the United Nations lists of designated individuals, groups or entities. Often, this will involve the adoption of the lists, at a national level, or the use of nationally-based designations of individuals or entities appearing on them.

In addition, in countering the financing of terrorism, States are obliged under Security Council resolution 1373 (2001), operative para. 1(c), to freeze, without delay, funds, other financial assets or economic resources of persons who commit, or attempt to commit, terrorist acts or participate in or facilitate the commission of terrorist acts; or of entities they own, control or direct, as well as of persons and entities acting on their behalf or direction, and to prohibit their nationals or any persons and entities within their territories from making any funds, financial assets or economic resources or financial or other related services available, directly or indirectly, for the benefit of persons who commit or attempt to commit or facilitate or participate in the commission of terrorist acts (operative para. 1(d)). As a result, many States have in place, at a national level, legal and institutional frameworks for the designation of individuals or groups their governments consider to be terrorists, that are on the United Nations list, or are designated for national or multilateral (e.g., European Union) purposes. The use of such designation mechanisms potentially raises a number of implementation challenges for States, and rights-based concerns. An example of these can be found in the landmark case of C–402/05 P and C–415/05, P. Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and Commission [2008] ECR I–6351.

TERRORIST VICTIMIZATION: VICTIMS OF TERRORISM

Victimization can be understood as the action of singling someone out for cruel or unjust treatment. This section explores terrorist victimization, for example, the factors that come into play when targeting the future victims of a planned terrorist attack.

Terrorist attacks can be broadly categorized into two categories: focused and indiscriminate. Historically, terrorism has largely fallen under the former category. As noted earlier, terrorist attacks were used as an instrument for politically motivated action, which targeted specific members of governments or political actors for the purposes of attaining a particular political aim (Schmid, 2006, p. 3; Turkovic´, 2006, p. 55). Such attacks involved some element of

participation in the conflict, albeit indirectly, between the terrorist group and the adversary.

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However, contemporary terrorism is characterized by an increasing frequency and magnitude of indiscriminate violence. Victims of terrorist attacks are not usually specifically selected on the basis of their individual characteristics, but are "chance" victims who happen to be in the wrong place at the wrong time. These victims serve as an instrument designed to influence third party actors (Šeparović, 2006, p. 20). It is partly this element of unpredictability and randomness of victim selection that gives terrorism its modern power—"a power enhanced manifold by the media's display and replay of acts of victimization" (Schmid, 2006, p. 9). This evolution of the focus of terrorism reflects a shift from individual terror to a dimension of mass murder and psychological warfare (Schmid, 2006, p. 9). In this sense, terrorism attempts to coerce a population and/or its leadership by inciting fear of being hurt (Šeparović, 2006, p. 21).

PRIMARY (DIRECT) VICTIMS OF TERRORIST ACTS OR CAMPAIGNS*

• Those who are killed by terrorist kidnappers, hostage-takers, gunmen or bombers. • Those who are injured, mutilated or mentally tortured by terrorists but ultimately released
or liberated. • Those who are wounded or die in a counter-terrorist rescue operation at the hands of terrorists or armed first responders. • Those who become mentally or physically handicapped or die (commit suicide) in a causal sequel to one or several terrorist events in which they were involved or of which they were direct witnesses.

 *Alex Schmid (2006). "Magnitudes and Focus of Terrorist Victimization." In Uwe Ewald and Ksenija Turkovi´c, eds. Large-Scale Victimisation as a Potential Source of Terrorist Activities, IOS Press, p. 4.

Although terrorist attacks are indeed serious crimes, it is important to remember that terrorist victimization differs from criminal victimization in that the former has an inherent political dimension. This political dimension may also encapsulate ideological or religious aims. For instance, the direct victim of a terrorist attack is rarely the ultimate target of the violence. Rather, the act of singling out a target serves as an amplifier to convey a broader message and to influence a wider audience, such as an adversary State of the terrorist organization (Schmid, 2006, p. 4). An important goal of terrorism is for mass audiences to pay attention to the messages being conveyed, and to undergo a sense of terror and panic as a result of the terrorist attack. The terror invoked in individuals is further amplified by a process of identification with the victim, a fear that "it could have been me" (Schmid, 2006, p. 7). The victims of terrorist attacks therefore serve as symbols of shared group or class characteristics, which in turn form one basis for their selection as victims (Šeparović, 2006, p. 21). In this sense, victims of terrorism serve as instrumental targets.

By using violence, or the threat of violence, wider audiences are put in a state of chronic fear or terror which takes a physical, psychological, social, political and economic toll on society as a whole (Šeparović, 2006, p. 21; Schmid, 2006, p. 5). This indirect method of combat can have several aims: to produce disorientation and/or force their targets to comply with their demands (e.g., government); to mobilize third party actors to act; or, to stir society and public

TEN TERRORIST AUDIENCES*

1. The adversary/-ies of the terrorist organization (usually one or several governments) 2. The constituency/society of the adversary/-ies 3. The targeted direct victims and their families and friends 4. Others who have reason to fear that they might be the next targets 5. "Neutral" distant audiences 6. The supporting constituency of the terrorist organization 7. Potential sympathetic sectors of domestic and foreign audiences 8. Other terrorist groups rivalling for prominence 9.

The terrorist and his or her organization 10. The media

Securitization Theory Applied: Migration and Security

Implications of the Securitisation of Migration

Implications of the Securitisation of Migration

In the last decade, many countries have seen a rise in immigration, coupled with an increasing fear of "terrorists", "illegal migrants" and other threats to internal safety. Thus the concept of securitization, which was first brought into the agenda of security studies by the so-called Copenhagen School of Security Studies, has become a major topic of discussion; in as far as what the implicative dynamics of securitization are, and what measures are needed in order to understand what exactly can be securitized. The Copenhagen School is represented in the writings of Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde who responded to the Post-Cold War call to reframe security and examine its dynamics and distinctive character. In contrast to traditional understandings of security, the Copenhagen School suggests that the state is not the only referent object for security. The book *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* sets about broadening the subject of security to include, not just the military sector, but five categories: military, economic, environmental, societal, and political. Thus the Copenhagen School suggests a constructivist operational method, distinguishing the process of securitization from that of politicization, for understanding who can securitize what and under what conditions (Buzan, Waever & de Wilde 1998).

The Copenhagen School's theory of securitization has provided important revenue for research on converging and particularly moving toward some form of union or uniformity between securitization and migration. The term "migration" will be used in this paper as a general category including immigrants, asylum-seekers, and refugees.

Given this outlook, the first chapter "The Emergence of Migration as a Security Threat in the European Union and the United States" deals with the origins of the securitization of migration in the context of both the European Union and the United States. The aim of the first chapter is to give a critical evaluation of the implications of the securitization of Although the reasons for securitization in the United States, i.e. the terrorist attacks of 9/11, and in Europe, i.e. the construction of the European Union and Schengen area were not the same, nonetheless the implications were very much similar: More restrictive immigration and asylum policies, new surveillance and control devices, and tighter external border controls were implemented and put in place.

Within the debate of the implications for a securitization of migration, politics and fear played an important role in the process of categorizing migrants as a potential security threat. This is noteworthy because fear is the result of an assessment of personal vulnerability to victimization

and when politicized it can be quite effective. Hence, the following chapter "The Securitization of Migration and the Politics of Fear" will explain how the securitization of migration reinforces a politics of fear.

The correlation between the politics of fear and the securitization of migration generates another important dimension in the process of categorizing migrants as a potential security threat. This dimension is racism. The final chapter "Racism and the Securitization of Migration" will highlight the importance of racism in the process of securitizing migrants and how the securitization of migration reinforces a racist discourse.

The Emergence of Migration as a Security Threat in the European Union and the United States

Since the 1980s, Europe was marked by dramatic changes led by the development of globalization, the fragmentation of major states such as the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, and the construction of the European Union and Schengen area. As the geopolitical context has changed, migration has become increasingly politicized at the European Union level. The political construction of migration increasingly referred to the destabilizing effects of migration and to the dangers it implied for public order. Many studies have explored the security logic of EU policies on migration and asylum, which have led to increased border security, deportations, and surveillance of immigrants (Huysmans 2000; Ceyhan & Tsoukala 2002; Karyotis 2007). Therefore, one can argue that the securitization of migration emerged first and foremost within the context of the European Union, and they should have a greater understanding of the complexities and all it entails. However, this is not the case. The production of similar discourses and the framing of migration as a part of security policies in the United States make it additionally difficult to evaluate the implications of a securitization of migration in a solely European context. Although some authors emphasize the role of the European Union in the process of securitizing migrants (Huysmans 2000; Karyotis 2007), some did not limit their analysis in the European context, but rather analyzed the securitization of migration as a phenomenon of "Western societies" (Ceyhan & Tsoukala 2002) or a "global phenomenon" (Tirman 2006). In order to critically examine the global implications of the securitization of migration, it is worth looking at these particular case studies, which the media and policymakers portray as potential safe haven for migrants: the European Union and the United States.

The United States has always been viewed as a country of immigrants, thus the issue of migration was never deemed or constructed as a threat to national identity, as in the case of the European Union. Yet in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001, the concept of migration as a security threat in the United States has emerged. John Tirman (2006) describes the ways in which the conception of migration has changed since 9/11. Up until 9/11, there had always been a correlation between migration and security in the United States. But it was mainly considered to be a threat to social security, such as jobs and welfare. However, after 9/11, terrorism quickly became the bases for framing the groundwork for discourse and practices relative to migration. The reaction to 9/11 and the subsequent securitization of migration affected in particular Arab and Muslim immigrants. At the same time other immigrants were affected, and most of those immigrants were from Latin America, particularly Mexico. A number of politicians and commentators have viewed the Mexican border as a security threat. So the initial focus of attention, reflecting the ethnicity of the 9/11 attackers, actually affected other ethnic

groups in hoping to enter the United States. (Tirman 2006, pp.1-2).

In the case of the European Union, several scholars came to the conclusion that the discourse that links migration to security has been reinforced in the aftermath of the September 11 events, where migration appeared in the discussion of the campaign against terrorism (Karyotis 2007, pp.6-8; Togral 2011, p.219). Karyotis concludes, however, that in the EU, the 9/11 terrorist attacks did not initiate new insecurities in connection with the migration policy, but the actions and the framing was the continuation of the trend that existed prior to the attacks (Karyotis 2007, pp.12-13). Hence, one can argue that the issue of terrorism in the EU context was not the main driving factor for securitizing migrants.

More likely, the main driving factor for securitizing migrants within the EU was the protection of European identity and culture, fostered by the conception of "Fortress Europe", which is based on the one hand on free mobility and the elimination of internal borders and, on the other, on restrictive external borders, focusing on exclusion and border management. In addition, the argument that immigrants have the potential to threaten the EU's economy, served as the legitimizing factor for the development of a restrictive migration policy and for cutting back the rights of third-country nationals, which have led to frame immigration as a security issue. Huysmans has described this development as a transformation of an "economic project of the internal market into an internal security project" (Huysmans 2000, p.752).

According to Ceyhan and Tsoukala the increase of migration flows combined with the construction of the European Union and Schengen area, as well as with the emergence of new economic agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), "significantly affected the forms and the meanings of borders, individual and collective identities, and the sense and nature of state sovereignty and authority" (Ceyhan & Tsoukala 2002, p.21). It is important to stress here, that these new political and economic developments demonstrate the close relationship between immigration and economic globalization.

Tirman highlighted this relationship by the case of rising immigration from Mexico to the United States. In this particular case, the loosening or elimination of borders, a feature of the North American Free Trade Agreement, was pictured at first as a solution to irregular migration (Tirman 2006, p.3). However, soon the idea that the NAFTA agreement will implicate the long-term reduction of irregular migration was being criticized by several scholars. In the late 1990s Peter Andreas observed that "the combination of NAFTA and the side-effects of Mexico's own domestic market reforms will add as much as several hundred thousand to the number of Mexicans who migrate to the United States annually though at least the end of the century" (Andreas 1998, p.609).

A recent analysis by the Migration Policy Institute along with data from the U.S. Census Bureau has shown, Andreas' assumption proved to be correct. The Mexican immigrant population in the U.S. rose from almost 4.3 million in 1990 to 9.1 million in 2000. These numbers include naturalized citizens, legal permanent residents, refugees, persons on student or work visas, and persons illegally residing in the United States. As of 2012, 6.7 million (59%) estimated unauthorized immigrants in the U.S. were from Mexico. Thus, Mexicans represent the largest unauthorized immigrant group in the United States (Zong & Batalova 2014). However, statistics collected by government agencies are open to a number of interpretations and one should be cautious about any claims made for the accuracy of existing data. In particular, studies on

irregular migration can hardly rely on quantitative research as statistics are poor, non-existent or contested.

The rise of irregular migration in the context of a new security era, where countering organized crime and terrorism was a top priority, has led to stricter public policies, new surveillance and control devices, and tighter external border controls despite discourses about globalization and open markets. Tirman points out that the securitization of migration makes it "much more difficult for migrants to cross borders, even as the world economy demands such movement" (Tirman 2006, p.3). In particular, border security measures are "costly in a globalized economy and unnecessary for security" (Tirman 2006, p.1).

These measures have led to a decline of Mexican immigration to the United States in recent years. But declining inflows appear to reflect not only the impact of tougher border enforcement, but also the impact of the Great Recession, and improved educational and economic opportunities in Mexico (Zong & Batalova 2014).

The US-Mexican border region can be also used as a model of reference or contrast with the Mediterranean setting, because it is at such strategic sites as these that we encounter the correlation between securitization, irregular migration, human trafficking, racism, and globally networked surveillance. These border areas can be considered as examples of extreme security, yet at the same time also of extreme insecurity for migrants, which most visibly emerge with the deaths of migrants crossing the Arizona desert and like so many who perish in the Mediterranean Sea. According to Ribas-Mateos, the complex Mediterranean context, characterized by sea borders, and the US-Mexico region with its extended land border "identify security-insecurity processes related to the restriction of borders in the age of globalization" (Ribas-Mateos 2011, pp.51-52).

The Securitization of Migration and the Politics of Fear

Within the debate of the implications of a securitization of migration, the role of emotions in the process of categorizing migrants as a potential security threat is noticeable. In a recent published article, Neta Crawford (2014) has pointed out that the discipline of International Relations has tended to ignore explicit considerations of the role that passions or emotions play in practices of international politics. Similarly, Claudia Aradau argues that the discipline of International Relations "generally has not taken stock of the emotional models that drive political interventions and strategies of governance" (Aradau 2004, p.255). Yet, in particular the process of securitizing migrants triggers an emotional expression, which should not be underestimated; that is fear.

The politics of fear developed specifically in the European context, not in the United States, which was presented as being more tolerant and open to migration. But the production of similar discourses and the framing of migration as a part of security policies in the United States as well, makes it difficult to argue the singularity in the European context. According to Ceyhan and Tsoukala "Western societies are witnessing the emergence of many existential and conceptual anxieties and fears about their identity, security, and well-being [...] By its transnational character, its dynamic, and its impact on people and institutions at all levels, migration is perceived as posing a serious challenge to the long-standing paradigms of certainty and order" (Ceyhan & Tsoukala 2002, pp.21-22). Therefore, the production of a discourse of fear and

proliferation of dangers with reference to the scenarios of chaos and disorder can also become a governmental instrument that can be used to steer and control actions and attitudes of citizens towards migrants.

In line with the arguments of the Copenhagen School, migration was constructed as a security threat by political and security elites, who had the capacity to produce security knowledge about the level and seriousness of the issue. More specifically, their approach signifies that securitization refers to a "speech act" through which "the issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure" (Buzan, Waever & de Wilde 1998, pp.23-24). In other words, securitization is the process through which migration becomes a security issue, not necessarily because of the nature or the objective importance of a threat, but because it is presented as such. Hence, "speech acts" can be identified as one of the catalysts for the construction of a discourse of fear and proliferation of dangers.

With this in mind, one has to consider the correlation between fear, and the perceived perception and the persuasive nature of politics and how it influences has led to a perceived notion of personal fear, for people who live in countries with a large migrant population. Based on personal factors such as one's physical features and other social factors, the anxieties, angst and behavioral practices are tangible and real. It can influence one's behavior and how they react in everyday life to their surroundings. Its cause can be summed up in one word; fear. The personal fear that some people have concerning perceived danger seem to focus mainly on migrants from varying racial ethnic groups. There is a vast difference between the general perceptions of fear, and reality. Fear is the result of an assessment of personal vulnerability to victimization. Aware of this, politicians have politicized its citizens through fear into believing that they are the victims and are being victimized from the upsurge of migrants who supposedly are the cause for their ills and drawbacks.

Perceived fear causes people to avoid certain places, because they fear being attack in one form or another and it is prevalent in communities where there are a high number of migrants. To combat their fear(s), an amalgamation of sort is created in order to justify their like behavior. It becomes an insular word in some sense, it provides the reassurance and confidence needed in order to continue the backlash against the influx of migrants to their country. What we see here is a fascinating case of how perceived fear can influence one's behavior. They made radical changes based on how they perceived their situation and way of life.

How can one not understand the plight of those who fear these situations? Certainly, one can make the argument that it would make more sense to worry about one's personal safety, rather than about perceived fear and the danger it entails. Even so, the migrants' presence has left some in the community with no other choice, but to avoid them at all cost. This they believe will protect them from having any contact with them; thus changing their over-all behavior. One cannot blame them for taking this position, but is it a reality, is it factual, or is it solely a perceived fear? Notwithstanding, this is what the politicians used as a means to sway, convince and influence their citizens in some instances.

Public fears about potential large-scale movements were more significant than the reality of migration itself in influencing the geopolitical environment. Claims by journalists and politicians that dozens of people are on their way and will threaten the host country's security and economy

are exaggerated, nonetheless such ideas have an impact on how migration is perceived and dealt with in the political domain. This kind of perspective is relevant when considering the current growing intensity of migration controls on the Euro-Mediterranean and US-Mexican borders.

It is noticeable that in the public sphere fear is often connected to irregular migration. Claudia Aradau observed in her article the securitization of human trafficking, and assessed two constructions of human trafficking: as a security threat and as a humanitarian problem. Restricting its focus to trafficking of women for the sex industry, the article highlights the double identification of these women as illegal migrants and victims. Aradau attempted to understand how a humanitarian discourse constructed around women's suffering can be connected to a logic of security and argued that "the constitution of subjects to be governed through pity or risk makes it possible for the vulnerable body of trafficked women to become the site of potential dangerous irruptions" (Aradau 2004, p.276). This literal embracement of pity into risk can also be observed in the recent events concerning the tragedy of drowned migrants in the Mediterranean Sea.

As outlined above, the politics of fear in the European Union and the United States is mainly constructed in relation to the differences in one's appearance, the undocumented migrant, or the refugee, namely, the "non-European", the "Muslim", or the "Hispanic" (Ceyhan & Tsoukala 2002, p.22; Togrul 2011, p.219). This particular creation of the concept of an enemy to the state and public order was not only reinforced by the media and policy debates, but also by scholarly publications. In 1993, Samuel Huntington developed his famous concept of the "Clash of Civilizations", which entered the public sphere and gained popularity beyond academia. The "Clash of Civilizations" is a theory, which suggests that people's cultural and religious identities will be the primary source of conflict in the Post-Cold War era. Such an approach promotes a policy of fear against everything that is different and might propose a danger to cultural or religious identity and unity. Thus, migration transforms into a threat not only to the security, but also to the identity of the host country.

Such a promotion of fear against migrants can lead to a dangerous generalization, namely the determination of all migrants as a whole with extremely negative implications, which is being reinforced by the securitization of migration. The main problem attributed to the process of securitization, is the inability of the securitizing actor to see migrants as individual humans. Rather migrants are being merged into a general category and labelled as a threat. Lastly, the use of such a category in official discourses does have a negative impact not only on public perceptions of migratory phenomena, but also on real lives of migrants through enforcement of state policies.

Racism and the Securitization of Migration

Several authors highlighted the role of racism in the process of securitization of migration (Huysmans 2000; Ibrahim 2005; Togral 2011). According to Maggie Ibrahim, the securitization of migration can be examined as "discourse through which relations of power are exercised" and is "racism's most modern form" (Ibrahim 2005, pp.163-164). Certainly, the antagonism directed towards migrants is based on the beliefs that the host country views his or her race and/or culture as superior, thus excluding migrants from all aspects of their society. One way in which this is done is through discriminatory and prejudicial laws. Therefore, a critical evaluation of the implications of the securitization of migration should also include an analysis of the role of

racism in this discourse.

As outlined by Ibrahim, the discourse of securitization of migration is built upon the concept that cultural difference leads to a "social breakdown" (Ibrahim 2005, p.164). However, how realistic is this notion, and is it a one-sided argument? What we do know is that this discourse has been possible through the broadening of the concept of security and the linking of risk and threat to migrants.

Once migration was viewed as a security threat, it led to a series of attempts to not only restrict its progression in countering organized crime and terrorism, but also to protect the "socio-political cohesion" (Karyotis 2007, p.1-2). Similarly, Huysmans points out that EU policies support the idea of "cultural homogeneity as a stabilizing factor" (Huysmans 2000, p.753) and that "the protection and transformation of cultural identity is one of the key issues through which the politics of belonging and the question of migration are connected" (Huysmans 2000, p.762). Therefore, the political construction of migration as a security threat should be embedded in the politics of belonging.

The position taken in this sense is one that highlights a broader contemporary European political point of view as well as attitude, one in which immigrants are viewed as undermining and weakening European cultural homogeneity. In this context, it becomes rather difficult for these policies to be one of inclusion, albeit when European culture and society are viewed as primary concerns. Thus, the challenge to assimilate or become a part of the European homogeneity will be a difficult task to say the least for immigrants, based on the strategies of supporting a securitization of migration agenda.

Ibrahim fosters this point of view by stating that the assumption that "cultural pluralism will lead to interethnic conflict which will dissolve the unity of the state" has been used for years as a means of limiting immigration in particular by right-wing governments (Ibrahim 2005, p.166).

In order to provide and ensure security for their citizens, nations develop traditions and systems of justice and rights. Immigrants from different cultural backgrounds are seen as an imbalance to the nation. It is thus seen as rational to preserve ones culture through the exclusion of other cultural groups. This form of exclusion based on race and cultural difference and associating such difference with security threats should be understood as racism. By examining a shift in racism, from notions of biological superiority, to exclusion based on cultural difference, it is possible to understand that the new migrant-as-a-threat narrative reflects a racist discourse that is reinforced through the securitization of migration (Ibrahim 2005, pp.165-166).

Several scholars have classified this racist discourse, which capitalizes on cultural differences rather than on biological ones to discriminate and exclude certain groups of people, as "new racism" (Ibrahim 2005; Togral 2011). "New racism" is a term coined in 1981 by Martin Barker, in the context of the ideologies supporting the British Conservative Party's rise in the UK, to refer to what he believed was racist public discourse depicting immigrants as a threat. According to Burcu Togral this "new racism" is much more "hidden" and "respectable" than previous forms of racism, since it has been built upon configurations, such as "preservation of one's identity, own way of life and values in the face of the destabilizing and damaging effects of other cultures" (Togral 2011, p.220). Yet, "new racism" does not mean the replacement of older forms of racist practices that used biological discourses as a pretext to exclude and discriminate certain

groups of people; rather "new racism" adds a cultural dimension to the already existing racist practices. Although the "new racism" discourse has no reference to "race" in the classical sense, it is still racism in that it "functions to maintain racial hierarchies of oppression" (Togral 2011, p.222).

"Euro-Racism" is also a form of "new racism". In the case of the European Union, Huysmans points out that the argument of a development of a "Euro-racism" is problematic because "national policies against racism and xenophobia, and the historical and political contexts in which racism and xenophobia have emerged, differ considerably across the Member States" (Huysmans 2000, p.764). Huysmans does not view the EU as actively implicated in the formation of a European-wide specific form of racism. Yet, he assumes, that the EU is indirectly involved in the rise of racist and xenophobic attitudes towards immigrants through its policy which uses the negative portrayal of migrant groups to promote a migration policy based on restrictions and control. Since the targeted groups often have an explicit link to Europe's colonial history, such a policy risks sustaining racist behavior towards migrants who have traditionally been subjected to racist stereotyping (Huysmans 2000, pp.764-765).

This point of view will be even more visible when considering that in comparison to the widely mediatized migration from African countries, migration from non EU-Eastern Europe or CIS countries to the EU has aroused less concern. The reason lies in the fact that migrants from these countries tend to be non-Muslims and are phenotypically less distinct from the majority populations of Western Europe.

The discussions concerning the securitization of migration in Europe and the implicated racism in this process also reveal a degree of Eurocentrism that is inherent in the assumption that Europe is the major destination of migrants.

Conclusion

At the European Union level, migration has become increasingly securitized since the 1980s, and was seen first and foremost as a threat to national identity. In contrast, the securitization of migration in the United States took place in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, where terrorism became the bases for framing the groundwork for securitizing discourses and practices relative to migration.

The securitization of migration is closely tied with the construction of the European Union and Schengen area, as well as with the emergence of new economic agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement. Particular case studies concerning the US-Mexican border and Euro-Mediterranean border showed how the rise of irregular immigration in the context of a new security era, where countering organized crime and terrorism was a top priority, leads to stricter public policies, new surveillance and control devices, and tighter external border controls despite discourses about globalization and open markets.

Within the debate of the implications of a securitization of migration, the role of a politics of fear in the process of categorizing migrants as a potential security threat is also noteworthy. I have highlighted the danger that the securitization of migration might reinforce a politics of fear. A politics of fear can lead to a dangerous generalization, namely the determination of all migrants as a whole with extremely negative implications. In terms of real politics, each migrant that is

"different" to the culture and identity of the host country constitutes a potential security threat. Therefore, the main problem attributed to the process of securitization, is the inability of the securitizing actor to see migrants as individual humans. Rather migrants are being merged into a general category.

The correlation between the politics of fear and the securitization of migration generates another important dimension in the process of categorizing migrants as a potential security threat; that is racism. By examining a shift in racism, from notions of biological superiority, to exclusion based on cultural difference, it is possible to understand that the categorization of a migrant as a security threat reflects a racist discourse that is reinforced through the securitization of migration.

The securitization of migration also implies a categorization of migration. Categories have always been an essential tool of political power. The use of such categories in official discourses does have an impact not only on public perceptions of migratory phenomena, but also on real lives of migrants through enforcement of state policies. The ways in which migrants are assessed by the state will affect issues of resource distribution, residential location, labor rights and ultimately for the most serious questions such as refugee status determination. Yet, the complexity, diversity and fluidity of migration makes it difficult to lump into one single category, and one should be aware that categorization often symbolizes discredited top-down approaches, which fix dynamic social processes into rigid structures.

With these aspects in mind, which have shown that the securitization of migration highly promotes negative implications, the question arises whether it is useful and necessary to define migration as an international security issue. The fact that even in the age of globalization we do not live in a world without borders, which are a part of the international security sphere and used as a means to control and restrict migration, proves that we cannot exclude migration from security debates. As evaluations of the US-Mexican as well as the Euro-Mediterranean border have shown, the correlation between securitization, irregular migration, human trafficking, racism, and globally networked surveillance is existent. Hence, migration can be defined as an international security issue but not one that should be protected against as a threat to "socio-political cohesion" and "cultural homogeneity" in the manner that Huysmans (2000) and Karyotis (2007) has highlighted. Rather migration is a security issue, because of the vulnerability of migrants and their susceptibility to exploitation and discrimination. Certainly, challenging the concept that migrants pose a security threat to Western societies should form a key part of any policy on migration, and one should be aware of the varied political intentions behind the label of the securitization of migration.

HIV/AIDS and International Security

Two assumptions underpin much of the literature that has examined the links between HIV/AIDS and security: (1) that HIV/AIDS is now firmly established as an international security issue; and (2) that Resolution 1308, adopted by the UN Security Council in July 2000, was the decisive moment in the securitization process. This article questions both of those assumptions. It argues that even within the Security Council, HIV/AIDS' status as a bona fide threat to international peace and security is not entirely secure. Despite the fact that the Resolution was adopted unanimously, there is considerable doubt over the extent to which the Council members were persuaded that HIV/AIDS is genuinely a threat to international peace and security.

Furthermore, the Council's subsequent actions suggest a retreat from the issue. The article moves on to examine statements made in and by some of the other key UN System bodies grappling with HIV/AIDS. Focusing in particular on the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and UNAIDS, it is argued that the international security framing of HIV/AIDS has not generally achieved a great deal of traction within these bodies. Alternative framings, in particular international development and human rights, occur far more frequently. This raises issues for our understanding of both securitization theory and the global governance of HIV/AIDS.

Now in its third decade, HIV/AIDS is well poised to become the most devastating pandemic in modern human history. Throughout the world an estimated 42 million people are already living with HIV, while in some African countries national HIV prevalence rates are currently thought to be well in excess of one-third of the adult population. The immense scale of this pandemic means that almost three times as many persons die from AIDS-related illnesses every day, than died during the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. So great is the scale now reached by this pandemic that scholars and policy makers are beginning to recognize that in the worst affected countries the longer-term impact of HIV/AIDS will not be confined to the individual human tragedies suffered by those persons living with the virus and by their respective families. In these same countries HIV/AIDS will also have a plethora of wider economic, political, and social ramifications that will need to be carefully considered and addressed. Among these hitherto overlooked ramifications, this chapter suggests, are the emerging human, national, and international security dimensions of the illness. Scholars and policy makers will have to recognize these security dimensions in order to arrive at a more comprehensive understanding of the nature of the current pandemic and for the level of the international response to become commensurate with the extent of the humanitarian and global security challenge posed by the AIDS pandemic.

Poverty and Security

Poverty and Conflict

Civil and regional conflicts cost lives and ruin economies but they can also incubate virtually every type of transnational threat by creating the optimal anarchic environment for external predators. Al Qaeda established training camps in conflict-ridden Sudan and Afghanistan and purchased diamonds from the West Africa conflict zone of Sierra Leone and Liberia. Al Qaeda also raised recruits in Chechnya, Bosnia and Kashmir. It targeted American soldiers in Somalia and, now, Iraq. Arms merchants as well as criminal and drug syndicates have profited from conflict zones in Colombia, Bosnia and Tajikistan. New diseases, like Ebola, Marburg, and West Nile spread from war-torn Congo, Angola and Uganda. Biodiversity, such as the mountain gorillas of Rwanda, can be lost in war zones.

Conflict, even in distant places, may impact the United States more directly — by spurring refugee flows, interrupting the supply of crucial commodities, and degrading potential export markets. Conflicts often result in costly humanitarian emergencies, destabilize whole sub-regions and, sometimes, necessitate outside intervention. U.S. forces have deployed in recent years to

evacuate American citizens, provide humanitarian assistance, restore order, or keep the peace in the Balkans, East Timor, Somalia, Liberia and Haiti. The British and French recently sent troops to Sierra Leone, Cote D'Ivoire, the Central African Republic and eastern Congo.

Among the important drivers of such costly conflicts is poverty. Numerous studies demonstrate that declining national income, low GDP per capita, primary commodity or natural resource dependence, and slow economic growth increase the risk and length of civil conflict. A country at GDP per capita of $250 has, on average, a 15% risk of experiencing civil war within the next five years. At a GDP per capita of $5,000, the risk of civil war is less than 1%.

Poverty and Disease

Disease poses an additional threat to U.S. national security. At least thirty new diseases have surfaced globally in the last three decades, while twenty previously detected diseases have re-emerged in new drug-resistant strains. Today, more than two million people cross international borders daily. The confluence of accelerating globalization and newly emergent diseases has proved deadly for Americans and others in the developed world. AIDS, SARS, Hepatitis C, antibiotic-resistant TB, dengue fever and West Nile virus are just a few of the newly discovered infectious diseases that have spread from the developing world to the U.S. or other wealthy countries.

Marburg virus, a remarkably contagious hemorrhagic fever, erupted in rural Angola last fall and has already killed at least 329 people. If just one infected person arrives in the slum-infested capital, Luanda, and comes in contact with one of the thousands of U.S. expatriates working in the oil sector who travel regularly back and forth to the U.S., Marburg could make its way to Houston.

Health experts' most alarming predication is that the H5N1 strain of avian flu, which is rampant in poultry stocks in about a dozen Asian countries and now Europe, will soon mutate into a virus easily transmitted from human to human. If this occurs, WHO's conservative estimate is that a pandemic could erupt killing between 2 million and 7.4 million people. An additional 1.2 billion would fall sick and 28 million would require hospitalization. A worst case estimate is that more than 60 million could die, exceeding the 40 million who perished in the great influenza epidemic of 1918-1919.

HIV/AIDS has already cost the world over 20 million lives. With more than forty million infected, this pandemic is the greatest killer of our time. Having decimated America's gay community in the 1980s, it is now the single biggest killer of African American women aged 25 to 34. As President Clinton determined in 2000, AIDS also threatens U.S. security. It weakens fragile states by hollowing out their militaries, stealing their most productive citizens, and leaving behind masses of orphans, who may turn to combat, crime or terror to survive. HIV/AIDS also may slow growth and deter investment in key emerging markets like South Africa, India, China and Brazil.

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Poverty contributes substantially and often directly to the spread of infectious disease. By

spurring population growth, contributing to immune-compromising malnutrition and exacerbating crowding and poor sanitary conditions, poverty fuels the transmission of disease. Water-borne diseases now account for 90% of infectious disease in developing countries. Roughly two million people will die this year of tuberculosis, most in the developing world, but the U.S. has also seen a resurgence of antibiotic resistant tuberculosis, especially in immigrant populations. Further, as the search for clean water and fire wood drives impoverished people deeper into forested areas, the risk of animal contact and exposure to new pathogens increases.

AIDS and malaria are endemic in many poor regions, though the causal link with poverty is disputed. There is no doubt, however, that both diseases dramatically erode economic growth. While AIDS began in many places as a killer of the upper echelons of society, it is now prevalent in poor communities in the U.S., China and Africa. Poverty and unemployment may drive prospective workers to leave home in search of work, such as to mining hostels in South Africa, where promiscuity is common and condom use is rare. Impoverished women, lacking education and awareness about disease transmission, or simply powerless, may engage in prostitution to feed their children. Without access to testing and treatment, many transmit the disease unwittingly to their partners and newborn children.

At the same time, poor states almost universally lack adequate health infrastructure, diagnosis and treatment regimes, and disease surveillance. According to the World Health Organization, low and middle income countries suffer 90% of the world's disease burden but account for only 11% of its health care spending. The lack of health infrastructure and surveillance capacity does not just kill Asians and Africans. By contributing to the late detection and poor treatment of new and re-emergent diseases, they reduce the capacity of host countries to contain outbreaks, such as Marburg or avian flu, before they spread. The economic, health and security consequences of these weak links in the global public health chain are potentially as dire for in the United States as they have proved deadly in the developing world.

Poverty and Environmental Degradation

Environmental degradation in the developing world can also have long-term adverse consequences for the U.S. Loss of biodiversity alters delicate ecosystems, reducing the world's stock of diverse flora and fauna, which have produced important medical benefits for mankind.

Deforestation is increasing, due to clearing of trees to open arable acreage in marginal areas. Logging for trade in exotic African and Asian hardwoods has magnified the problem, resulting in the loss of 2.4% of the world's forest cover since 1990. Desertification is also spreading to the extent that two billion hectares of soil, or 15% of the planet's land cover, is already degraded. Although carbon emissions in rich and rapidly growing economies are the main culprit, desertification and deforestation can accelerate global climate change. Global warming is already rendering coastal areas more vulnerable to flooding and expanding the zones into which mosquito-borne and other tropical diseases can reach.

Much of the world's environmental degradation can be attributed to population pressure. From 1950 to 1998, the world's population doubled. It has grown a further 14% in the last ten years to 6.4 billion. By 2050, global population is on track to reach nine billion. This growth has occurred disproportionately in the developing world. Poverty substantially fuels this growth, as families

have more children in response to high infant mortality and in order to increase income potential.

Poverty and International Crime and Narcotics Trafficking

Transnational crime syndicates pose another type of threat. They reap billions each year from illicit trafficking in drugs, hazardous waste and chemicals, humans, endangered species, and weapons – all of which reach American shores. Terrorist groups have raised funds through tactical alliances with transnational criminal syndicates operating in lawless zones from the Philippines to Afghanistan to the Tri-border region of South America. In turn, trade in illicit goods and arms helps to perpetuate conflict, thereby creating durably hospitable environments for terrorists.

Low-income states are often weak states that lack effective control over substantial portions of their territory and resources. Conflict, difficult terrain and corruption render them even more vulnerable. Under-resourced and poorly trained immigration and customs officials as well as police, military, judiciary and financial systems create vacuums into which transnational predators can easily move. Where ecological conditions permit, poverty also fosters ideal socio-economic conditions for drug production, as in the Andes, parts of Mexico, and South Asia. Where production is difficult, drug trafficking may still thrive, as in Nigeria and Central Asia. Not surprisingly, the drug couriers, human slaves, prostitutes, petty thieves, and others drawn into global criminal enterprises often come from the ranks of the unemployed or desperately poor.

Poverty and Terrorism

Finally, poverty contributes, indirectly but significantly, to transnational, anti-U.S. terrorism perpetrated by sub-state actors such as Al Qaeda. While there is much debate over whether poverty causes individuals to become terrorists, this question misses the larger picture, which is poverty's role in facilitating terrorist activity at the country level. Nevertheless, the controversy bears some scrutiny, if only because it has gained currency.

Skeptics argue that the 9/11 hijackers were predominantly middle class, educated Saudis, so poverty cannot bear any meaningful relationship to terrorism. Others note that the poorest are struggling merely to survive and have no capacity to plan and execute terrorist acts. They claim that, if poverty spawned terrorism, there would be a lot more terrorism in the developing world.

Such analyses are unconvincing in several respects. First, a significant body of contrary evidence undermines the argument that socio-economic conditions are unrelated to the recruitment of terrorist foot soldiers, if not their leaders. Poverty, vast income disparities, joblessness, and lack of hope for the future may engender sufficient levels of fatalism, perhaps especially among educated, but under-employed youth, to render them vulnerable to recruitment by radical groups linked to terrorists.

The social and economic circumstances under which Al Qaeda and militant Islam emerged in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Central Asia and North Africa also belie this sweeping conclusion. In the greater Middle East, the emergence of a youth bulge in the 1970s was followed by the rise of political Islam. Many of these countries suffer from high unemployment rates, an exploding labor force and stagnant real wages. For several decades, Saudi Arabia, home of many 9/11

hijackers,Guantanamo detainees and foreign fighters now in Iraq has experienced declining GDP per capita at times greater than almost any other country in the world. In Southeast Asia, the educational and legal systems of several countries fell apart in the wake of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, creating a void which has since been partially filled by radical institutions and madrassas. Numerous analysts hold that Al Qaeda has gained adherents and global reach in part by seizing on the hopelessness and despair of aggrieved Muslims in all of these regions.

However, the primary flaw in the conventional argument that poverty is unrelated to terrorism is its failure to capture the range of ways in which poverty can exacerbate the threat of transnational terrorism — not at the individual level — but at the state and regional level. Poverty bears indirectly on terrorism by sparking conflict and eroding state capacity, both of which create conditions that can facilitate terrorist activity.

Poor countries with limited institutional capacity to control their borders and coastlines can provide safe havens, training grounds, and recruiting fields for terrorist networks. To support their activities, networks like Al Qaeda have exploited the territory, cash crops, natural resources and financial institutions of low-income states. It is estimated that 25% of the foreign terrorists recruited by Al Qaeda in Iraq have come from North and Sub-Saharan Africa.

Militants have also taken advantage of lax immigration, security and financial controls to plan, finance and execute operations in Kenya, Tanzania, Ethiopia and Indonesia. Al Qaeda is now believed to have extended its reach to approximately 60 countries worldwide.

Country-level poverty may also weaken state capacity to provide essential human services, and thereby, render states more vulnerable to predation by terrorist networks. In low-income countries, social and welfare services are often inadequate, creating voids in areas like nutrition, education and health that may be filled by radical NGOs or madrassas. In Mali, Somalia and Bangladesh, for example, international Islamic charities are closing the welfare gap, and terrorist activity is reportedly on the rise. In Yemen, and most recently in Pakistan following the earthquake, radical charitable groups associated with terrorist organizations have delivered social welfare services when governments fail to do so. In this fashion, terrorist groups garner public support, while also using such charities to fundraise.

In sum, poverty plays a complex and dual role in facilitating the emergence and spread of transnational security threats. First, it substantially increases the risk of conflict, which in turn serves as especially fertile breeding grounds for such threats. Second, poverty, more indirectly, can give rise to conditions at the local or state level that are conducive to each of these transnational threats. Beyond degrading human security, it can severely erode state capacity to prevent or contain such threats, each of which can create such adverse conditions within and beyond state boundaries that poverty is, in turn, increased. Thus, a downward spiral or extreme doom loop is set in motion, in which poverty fuels threats that contribute to deeper poverty, which intensifies threats. Discerning and disaggregating this dangerous dynamic is essential to grasping the important, if complex, national security rationale for far greater U.S. and international action to reduce global poverty.

Conclusion: Breaking a Doom Spiral?

Given this doom loop, what are we doing about global poverty? Momentum for action is

building in several capitals. Based on recent donor country commitments, the OECD now estimates that overall ODA flows to developing countries will increase by at least $50 billion by 2010. Sixteen of the world's twenty two major donor countries including France, the UK, Germany, Italy and Greece have pledged to meet the 2002 Monterrey Financing for Development Conference target of devoting 0.7% of their gross national income to overseas development assistance. Japan promised to double aid to Africa within three years. While not yet committing to 0.7%, Canada recently promised to double by 2010 its development assistance over 2001 levels. G-8 leaders agreed at Gleneagles to increase development assistance to Africa by $25 billion annually by 2010, nearly $17 billion of which will be financed by European countries. The major outlier is Washington.

Indeed, President Bush has ruled out raising the U.S. up from the current 0.16% of per capita gross national income spent on development assistance (which places the U.S. second to last among OECD countries) to the Monterrey target of 0.7%. On the eve of the G-8 Summit, President Bush pledged to double aid to Africa by 2010, but relatively little of that additional $4 billion represents new money. Rather, the President can meet this goal simply by keeping his earlier promises to fully fund his Millennium Challenge Account and HIV/AIDS initiative. The President also claims to have "tripled" aid to Africa over the last four years; in fact, total U.S. assistance to Africa has not even doubled. It has increased 56% in real dollars (or 67% in nominal dollars) from FY 2000 to FY 2004, the last completed fiscal year.

More than half that increase is emergency food aid — not assistance that alleviates poverty. Overall, the U.S. pledge toward the G-8 goal is small compared to Europe's, given the relative size of the U.S. economy. It also falls well short of the customary minimum U.S. contribution to multilateral funding instruments of at least 25 percent, or $6 billion.

The recent G-8 agreement to cancel debt to the 18 poorest nations which are committed to good governance, while providing additional resources to maintain development bank lending, is an important step. Yet, partial debt cancellation and relatively modest aid increases to Sub-Saharan Africa seem to mark the current limit of the Bush Administration's will to reach the UN Millennium Development Goals (or MDGs).

Achieving the MDGs would lift more than 500 million people out of extreme poverty and enable over 300 million to live without hunger by 2015. It would also ensure universal primary education and reduce by two-thirds mortality rates for children under five. If the 2015 goals are met, Columbia University economist Jeffrey Sachs predicts that extreme poverty can be "substantially eliminated" by 2025.

According to the UN Secretary General, the most important elements for developed countries on the global poverty reduction agenda are: 1) increasing development assistance to 0.7% of rich countries GNI by 2015; 2) substantial additional contributions to the Global Fund for HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria; 3) elimination of agricultural subsidies and export credits that squeeze poor farmers out of the global market; 4) and duty-free, quota-free market access for all exports from least developed countries. To date, the Bush Administration has shown little practical readiness to implement these crucial next steps.

To some Americans, the investments and policy shifts required of the U.S. to make meaningful progress on global poverty reduction appear unaffordable and, to others, undesirable. Opening

U.S. markets to goods from the least developed countries may cause further short-term job loss in sensitive sectors in the U.S. Polls show most Americans already think we spend too much on foreign aid. When asked how much they think we spend, the answer is typically 10-15% of the federal budget. When asked what we should spend, they say roughly 5%. Few know we actually spend less than 1% of the federal budget on foreign assistance.

To devote 0.7% annually of our national income to overseas development assistance would cost about $80 billion – a great sum in an age of rampant deficits, approximately equivalent to the cost of the 2002 Farm Bill, the latest supplemental appropriation for Iraq, almost a fifth of the defense budget, or almost $20 billion more than has already been spent as a down-payment on hurricane recovery. Moreover, when we have just been painfully reminded of the ghastly poverty that persists here in America, it is legitimate to ask: why we should even bother fighting poverty in Africa? And given conflict, corruption and fragile states, many wonder whether more aid to developing countries would not simply be pouring 'money down a rat-hole?' Can foreign aid ever make a lasting difference?

Increasingly, there is convincing evidence that foreign aid can make a crucial difference, especially in countries lacking resources to jump-start rapid economic growth. In Taiwan, Botswana, Uganda and Mozambique, foreign assistance successfully helped build the foundation for development. South Korea was able to create millions of jobs while receiving nearly $100 per person in today's dollars of aid annually from 1955 to 1972. Botswana, the world's fastest growing economy between 1965 and 1995, received annual aid flows averaging $127 per person during this period and rapidly expanded diamond exports. A recent study by the Center for Global Development finds that, irrespective of the strength of a country's institutions or the quality of its policies, certain aid flows have strong pro-growth effects, even in the short-term. Not only is aid beneficial, on balance, but its effectiveness has also improved since the 1980s. Nevertheless, it will take more than large, well-targeted aid flows to "make poverty history."

The most important ingredients are improved economic policies and responsible governance in developing countries. Yet those alone will not suffice. Rich countries will need to drop trade distorting subsidies, further open their markets, encourage job creating foreign investment, cancel debt, play a more active role in preventing and resolving conflicts, as well as assist recovery of post-conflict societies.

For the U.S. to meet this challenge, it will require a near tectonic shift in our national security policy. Policymakers must first come to view transnational security threats as foremost among our potential enemies. They must then embrace a long-term strategy in partnership with other developed countries to counter these threats. Such a strategy should be based on the imperative to strengthen weak states' legitimacy as well as their capacity to control their territory and fulfill the basic human needs of their people. We must invest in the twin pillars of promoting sustainable democracy and development. Finally, the President and Congress must commit the resources to finance this strategy and see it to fruition. It will be expensive to do so. It may well be politically unpopular to do so. But we can be virtually certain over the long run that Americans will pay more dearly, if our leaders fail to appreciate the risks and costs to the U.S. of persistent poverty throughout the developing world.

Environmental Security

Environmental security examines threats posed by environmental events and trends to individuals, communities or nations. It may focus on the impact of human conflict and international relations on the environment, or on how environmental problems cross state borders.

☐ Definitions of environmental security and created a synthesis definition:

Environmental security is environmental viability for life support, with three sub-elements:

- preventing or repairing military damage to the environment,
- preventing or responding to environmentally caused conflicts, and
- protecting the environment due to its inherent moral value.

It considers the abilities of individuals, communities or nations to cope with environmental risks, changes or conflicts, or limited natural resources. For example, climate change can be viewed a threat to environmental security (see the article climate security for more nuance to the discussion.) Human activity impacts CO_2 emissions, impacting regional and global climatic and environmental changes and thus changes in agricultural output. This can lead to food shortages which will then cause political debate, ethnic tension, and civil unrest.[1]

Environmental security is an important concept in three fields: international relations and international development and human security.

Within international development, projects may aim to improve aspects of environmental security such as food security or water security, but also connected aspects such as energy security, that are now recognised as Sustainable Development Goals at UN level.[2] Targets for MDG 7 about environmental sustainability show international priorities for environmental security. Target 7B is about the security of fisheries on which many people depend for food. Fisheries are an example of a resource that cannot be contained within state borders. A conflict before the International Court of Justice between Chile and Peru about maritime borders and their associated fisheries[3] is a case study for environmental security.

History

The Copenhagen School defines the referent object of environmental security as the environment, or some strategic part of it.

Historically, the definition of international security has varied over time. After World War II, definitions typically focused on the subject of realpolitik that developed during the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union.

As tensions between the superpowers eased after the collapse of the Soviet Union, academic discussions of definitions of security significantly expanded, particularly including environmental threats associated with the political implications of resource use or pollution.[5] By the mid-1980s, this field of study was becoming known as "environmental security". Despite a wide range of semantic and academic debates over terms, it is now widely acknowledged that environmental factors play both direct and indirect roles in both political disputes and violent

conflicts.

In the academic sphere environmental security is defined as the relationship between security concerns such as armed conflict and the natural environment. A small but rapidly developing field, it has become particularly relevant for those studying resource scarcity and conflict in the developing world. Prominent early researchers in the field include Felix Dodds, Norman Myers, Jessica Tuchman Mathews, Michael Renner, Richard Ullman, Arthur Westing, Michael Klare, Thomas Homer Dixon, Geoffrey Dabelko, Peter Gleick, Rita Floyd and Joseph Romm.

Origins

According to Jon Barnett, environmental security emerged as an important concept in security studies because of some interrelated developments which started in 1960s. The first one was the increasing level of environmental consciousness in so called developed countries.[6] Various occurrences and events triggered the growth of the environmental movement during this period of time. Rachel Carson's well-known book *Silent Spring* was one of the extraordinary publications of that time and brought greater degree of environmental awareness among ordinary people by warning them of the dangers to all natural systems including animals and food chain from the misuse of chemical pesticides such as DDT. Whilst Carson undoubtedly contributed to public debate at the time she was arguably not amongst the more radical 'social revolutionaries' who were also urging greater public awareness of environmental issues.[7] Moreover, a number of the largest well-known environmental non-governmental organizations such as the World Wildlife Fund (1961), Friends of the Earth (1969), and Greenpeace (1971) were founded during that time.[6] Climate security is an extension of environmental security.

The second notable development which brings the emergence of concept of environmental security was number of scholars started to criticize the traditional notion of security and mainstream security debates in their work from 1970s by emphasizing its inability to handle environmental problems at national and international security level.[6] First commentators were Richard Falk who published 'This Endangered Planet' (1971), and Harold and Margaret Sprout who wrote 'Toward a Politics of Planet Earth' (1971). These two commentators asserted in their book that the notion of security can no longer be centered only on military power, rather nations should collectively take measurements against common environmental problems since they pose threat to national well-being and thus international stability. These main ideas about environmental interdependence between countries and common security threat have remained key themes of environmental security studies.[6][8] However, not until Richard Ullman publishes an academic article named "Redefining Security" (1983), radical departure from the dominant security discourse haven't happened. Ullman offered the following definition of national security threat as "an action or sequence of events that (1) threatens drastically and over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state, or (2) threatens significantly to narrow the range of policy choices available to the government of a state, or to private, nongovernmental entities within the state".[9] Significant other scientists onward also linked the issue of security by focusing on the role of environmental degradation in causing violent conflict. Others, while recognizing the importance of environmental problems, argued that labeling them 'environmental security' was problematic and abandoned analytical rigor for normative and emotional power.[10]

Environmental change and security

Even though environmental degradation and climate change sometimes cause violent conflict within and between countries and other times not,[11] it can weaken the national security of the state in number of profound ways. Environmental change can undermine the economic prosperity which plays big role in country's military capacity and material power. In some developed countries, and in most developing countries, natural resources and environmental services tend to be important factors for economic growth and employment rate. Income from and employment in primary sectors such as agriculture, forestry, fishing, and mining, and from environmentally dependent services like tourism, may all be adversely affected by environmental change. If natural capital base of an economy erodes, then so does the long-term capacity of its armed forces.[6][12] Moreover, changes in environmental condition can exposes people to health threats, it can also undermine human capital and its well-being which are essential factors of economic development and stability of human society.

Climate change also could, through extreme weather events, have a more direct impact on national security by damaging critical infrastructures such as military bases, naval yards and training grounds, thereby severely threatening essential national defense resources.[13]

Week 12   3hrs
Topic 12
AU Common Foreign and Security Policy

Common foreign and security policy

The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union aims to preserve peace and strengthen international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter.

Key facts:

- The Common Foreign and Security Policy Budget finances civilian missions, EU Special Representatives, stabilisation actions as well as multilateral and bilateral non-proliferation and disarmament projects.
- A flexible management of the budget allows actions to rapidly respond to unforeseen geopolitical events and developments on the ground.
- More than ten EU Common Security and Defense Policy civilian missions in Europe, Africa and the Middle East, with over 2,000 persons involved, have been deployed over the last 10 years.

The European Commission uses the Common Foreign and Security Policy budget to respond in a rapid and flexible manner to external conflicts and crises, to build the capacity of partner countries and to protect the EU and its citizens. Under its Common Foreign and Security Policy, the European Commission funds civilian stabilisation missions, EU Special Representatives, the Kosovo Specialist Chamber, actions in the field of non-proliferation and disarmament, the European Security and Defence College. The Service for Foreign Policy Instruments prepares the budget for each operation, ensures the funding based on the Council legal act and monitors

implementation.

The EU funds the following activities under its Common Foreign and Security Policy budget:

- Civilian Common Security and Defence Policy missions that work towards regional and international security and stability. The missions aim to improve security and strengthen the rule of law, supporting third countries in the fight against terrorism, people smuggling and organised crime, strengthening police and judicial authorities and monitoring compliance with international agreements.
- European Union Special Representatives who promote the EU's policies and interests in troubled regions and countries and play an active role in efforts to consolidate peace and to promote stability and the rule of law. They are independent natural persons, appointed by the Council and entrusted with a mandate in relation to a particular policy issue.
- Non-Proliferation and Disarmament activities that contribute to the universalisation and effective implementation of international treaties, conventions and agreements addressing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including their delivery mechanisms, and of conventional arms. The latter target the illicit accumulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons and aim to implement effective controls on international arms transfers, thereby contributing to peace, security and stability worldwide and to the safety of European citizens.

The role of the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments

The Service for Foreign Policy Instruments implements the Common Foreign and Security Policy budget in close consultation with the European External Action Service, responsible for operational planning and policy direction. The Service participates actively in the legal, financial and institutional negotiations and sets up the necessary financial implementation structures, prepares and approves budgets and represents the Commission when Member States discuss actions funded by the budget.

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